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Abstract 
 
The ‘global city’ (and the related concept of global city-regions) is presently hegemonic in South 
Africa’s urban reconstruction discourse. It has come to constitute, especially for cities like 
Johannesburg and its urban region of Gauteng, a prototypical image of city-ness; the ultimate 
barometer for advanced development. This is so even as its origins can be traced to a small sample of 
cities in the North (most prominently New York, and London), and its applicability to, relevance or 
usefulness for cities in developing countries has been questioned. City Development Strategies 
anchored on this discourse, and their related economic policies, promote an economic development 
trajectory in which finance and services are the main drivers.  
 
This research adopts the Kaldorian proposition that manufacturing is the sector better positioned to 
drive economic growth and development. It argues that developing countries, and their cities and 
urban regions, are riddled with the catch-up problem; which requires the deliberate reallocation of 
resources from low-productivity diminishing returns activity sectors (e.g. agriculture and other 
extractive activities) to higher productivity, increasing returns activity sectors (especially 
manufacture). It argues that this change in the dynamics of production structures of these economies 
will be brought about by technology capability building whose realisation might require a 
developmental state that drives selective industrial policy. As such, neither a swift shift to finance and 
services (which in most of developing country economy cases entails a degree of premature 
deindustrialisation), nor mere clustering and agglomeration as envisaged in the global city and new 
regionalism literature respectively suffices in such contexts.   
 
Reviewing a select set of policy documents and strategies (of both the Gauteng Provincial 
Government and of its three metropolitan municipalities) adopted between 2006 and 2011; the 
research assesses how manufacturing is accounted for in the global city region agenda proposed for 
the Gauteng urban region, and the implications of such for that region’s future economic trajectory. It 
finds that at inception, the City Region Strategy was premised on an uncritical acceptance of 
neoliberal globalisation as a given, necessitating the adoption of an entrepreneurial approach to 
governance, and of finance and services as the most strategic sectors for connectivity and 
competitiveness in the global economy. These assumptions continue to dominate thinking in later 
years, despite the fact that manufacturing remains the most critical sector in international trade, output 
and productivity growth, and gross domestic fixed investment. This even as reference is made to the 
importance of manufacturing for the Gauteng economy, and interventions such as the automotive 
industry development in areas like Tshwane are being rolled out.  
  
3 |  
 
 
Table of Contents 
Abstract ..................................................................................................................................... 2 
Declaration................................................................................................................................ 5 
Acknowledgements .................................................................................................................. 6 
Dedication ................................................................................................................................. 7 
Acronyms .................................................................................................................................. 8 
List of Illustrations ................................................................................................................... 9 
Chapter 01: Preliminary Notes: What is at issue? .............................................................. 10 
1.1. Introduction ........................................................................................................................... 10 
1.2. Research Problem/Question .................................................................................................. 10 
1.3. Hypothesis............................................................................................................................. 11 
1.4. Research Aims/Objectives .................................................................................................... 12 
1.5. Preliminary Literature Survey and Core Sources .................................................................. 12 
1.6. Research Approach and Method ........................................................................................... 13 
1.7. Structure ................................................................................................................................ 14 
SECTION A: Globalisation: Accumulation Regimes, Territorial Moments, and the 
Catch-up Problem .................................................................................................................. 16 
Chapter 02: From World (Global) Cities to Worlding (Globalising) Cities..................... 18 
2.1. Introduction ................................................................................................................................ 18 
2.2.1. The World City Hypothesis ................................................................................................ 19 
2.2.2. Global City .......................................................................................................................... 20 
2.3. Worlding Cities .......................................................................................................................... 23 
2.4. From Cities to Circuits: A partial rejoinder ............................................................................... 24 
2.5. Concluding Notes: Towards Dialectical Urbanism .................................................................... 25 
Chapter 03: Competitive City-Regionalism: Features and Fissures ................................. 26 
3.1. Introduction ................................................................................................................................ 26 
3.2. The point of departure: on regimes and modes .......................................................................... 27 
2.3. The Post-Fordist Regime: Flexible Accumulation ..................................................................... 28 
3.3.1. …its leading ensembles ...................................................................................................... 28 
3.3.2. … its clustering and agglomeration tendencies .................................................................. 29 
3.3.3. The institutions and conventions to sustain it ..................................................................... 29 
3.3.4. Its policy implications ......................................................................................................... 29 
3.3.5. Its regional motors .............................................................................................................. 30 
3.4. Fissures: Limits to competitive city-regionalism ....................................................................... 30 
4 |  
 
3.5. Conclusion ................................................................................................................................. 31 
Chapter 04: Development as Structural Change, Competitiveness and the Catch-up 
problem ................................................................................................................................... 33 
4.1. Introduction ................................................................................................................................ 33 
4.2. Production Structures: Prospects and Implications .................................................................... 34 
4.2.1. Manufacturing as a special sector ....................................................................................... 34 
4.2.2. Financialisation, Services and Premature Deindustrialisation ............................................ 35 
4.3. Divergent routes to economic development ............................................................................... 36 
4.3.1. Comparative advantage, facilitating states and efficient markets ....................................... 36 
4.3.2. Technological capability building, developmental states and selective industrial policy ... 38 
4.4. Conclusion: Competitiveness and the role of cities ................................................................... 39 
Section B: Quick Notes on South Africa’s Global City Region ......................................... 41 
Chapter 05: Africa’s first global city-region ....................................................................... 41 
5.1. Introduction ................................................................................................................................ 41 
5.2. The Gauteng economy ............................................................................................................... 41 
5.2.1. South Africa’s economic engine ......................................................................................... 41 
5.2.2. A Services Economy? ......................................................................................................... 42 
5.2.3. Manufacturing matters ........................................................................................................ 44 
5.3. The envisaged future Gauteng economy .................................................................................... 44 
5.3.1. Towards a globally competitive city-region ....................................................................... 44 
5.3.2. Metropolitan aspirations ..................................................................................................... 46 
3.3 Provincial frameworks ............................................................................................................ 47 
5.3. Concluding notes ................................................................................................................... 48 
Section C: Conclusion .................................................................................................................. 49 
 
  
5 |  
 
Declaration 
 
I, Moses Nzama Khaizen Metileni, declare that this research is my own, unaided work. It is 
submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Degree of Master of Commerce in 
Development Theory and Policy at the University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg. It has 
not been submitted before for any degree or examination in this or any other university. 
 
 
Signature:  
  
Date: 10 June 2015 
  
6 |  
 
Acknowledgements 
 
Dr. Firoz Khan, my supervisor, for his enriching and sustained intellectual guidance, and 
generous patience 
 
Nicholas Pons-Vignon, for APORDE 2011, which reoriented me from spatial planning to 
heterodox economics 
 
All my lecturers at CSID, and classmates over the two years; for the intellectual camaraderie 
 
  
7 |  
 
Dedication 
 
For Ndzhaka Nzama Mtileni 
 
The threads are incomplete, the puzzle confused and confusing, the in-betweens are end-
states, beginnings, and elsewheres – we search for meaning, to evade the paralysis of dogma, 
and to imagine alternates and counterpoints… 
 
 
 
 
 
8 |  
 
Acronyms  
 
BBBEE Broad based Black Economic Empowerment (BBBEE) 
CAD  Comparative-advantage-defying strategies 
CAF  Comparative-advantage-following strategies  
CoJ  City of Johannesburg 
CoT  City of Tshwane 
CSIR  The Council for Scientific and Industrial Research  
DFID  Department for International Development, UK 
EMM  Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality 
EPWP   Expanded Public Works Programme 
GCR  Global City Region 
GCRA  Global City Region Academy  
GCRO  Gauteng City Region Observatory 
GDED  Gauteng Department of Economic Development 
GDoF  Gauteng Department of Finance 
GDP  Gross Domestic Product  
GDPR  Gross Domestic Product by Region 
GDS  Growth and Development Strategy 
GEGDS Gauteng Employment, Growth and Development Strategy 
GIPF  Gauteng Industrial Policy Framework 
GNP  Gross National Product 
GPG  Gauteng Provincial Government 
GSDP  Gauteng Spatial Development Perspective 
GTI  Gauteng Tooling Initiative 
GVA  Gross Value Added 
ICT  Information and communications technology  
IDC  Industrial Development Corporation 
IPAPs  Industrial Policy Action Plans 
NIPF  National Industrial Policy Framework  
NSE  New Structural Economics   
OECD  The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
SARB  South African Reserve Bank 
SMMEs Small Medium and Micro Enterprises 
UNIDO United Nations Industrial Development Organization 
 
 
 
  
9 |  
 
List of Illustrations  
Figures 
 
Figure 5.1: Sectoral Composition, Gauteng and South Africa, 2009  ..................................... 42 
Figure 5.2: Top-3 Contributors (per municipality) + Mining and Quarrying  ......................... 43 
Tables 
 
Table 5.1: Manufacturing Key Economic Indicators, Gauteng, 2002-2009…………………44 
Table 5.2: Potential Sectors for Policy Targeting in Gauteng……………………………….47 
 
Maps 
 
Map 5.1: Concentrations (economic activity and population), South Africa………………………..42 
Map 5.2: Schematic Footprint of the Gauteng City-Region………………………………………....45 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
10 |  
 
Chapter 01: Preliminary Notes: What is at issue? 
 
1.1. Introduction 
 
The ‘global city’ (and the related concept of global city-regions) is presently hegemonic 
in South Africa’s urban reconstruction discourse (see for example Pillay, 2004; 
McDonald, 2008; Cornelissen, 2008; Murray, 2008). It has come to constitute especially 
for cities like Johannesburg and its urban region of Gauteng, a prototypical image of city-
ness; the ultimate barometer for advanced development (City of Johannesburg, 2002; 
Gauteng Provincial Government, 2006a  and 2006b). As Friedmann (1995a: 36) puts it, 
‘[t]he golden phrase [i.e. world city]’ has ‘become a badge of status’. This is so even as 
its origins can be traced to a small sample of cities in the North (most prominently New 
York, and London) (Sassen, 2001), and its applicability to, relevance or usefulness for 
cities in developing countries is questioned (Gugler, 2004; Metileni, 2006; Robinson, 
2006). 
 
City Development Strategies anchored in this discourse, and their related economic 
policies, promote an economic development trajectory in which finance and services are 
the main drivers. This research adopts the Kaldorian proposition that manufacturing is the 
sector better positioned to drive economic growth and development (see Kaldor, 1966; 
Thirwall, 2002). It assesses how manufacturing is accounted for in the global city region 
agenda proposed for the Gauteng urban region.  
 
1.2. Research Problem/Question 
 
Following the recent economic crisis, the Brookings Institution’s Global Metro Monitor 
December 2010 report, which is a preliminary overview of 150 metropolitan economies
1
, 
concludes that: ‘the Johannesburg metropolitan region holds the unfortunate distinction of 
being among the few metros outside Europe and the United States that were hit hardest by 
the recession’ (Brookings Institution: 2010: 44). Metropolitan performance, the report 
argues, is reflective of ‘intrinsic factors such as…industrial base, and the impact of 
national fiscal, monetary, and trade policies’ (ibid: 5).  
 
Sassen (2011: 56) argues that the specific economic histories of those cities that are now 
classified as global cities is very important to understanding their current performance, 
and (it may be added) their future performance in the global economy. If global cities are 
redefined as high performers in terms of sustainable growth rates, living standards, and 
employment (among other indicators); a different understanding of critical economic 
sectors and policies that produce global cities emerges. If it is no longer the finance and 
service centres of New York and London that after the crisis are the high performers in 
the global economy, and cities like Mumbai, Sao Paolo and Beijing come to feature 
                                                          
1
 Measuring employment and gross value added (GVA), per capita growth pre-, during, and  post-recession 
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prominently in global rankings (see for example Knight Frank Research, 2014); an 
understanding of how these cities rose to the top thus matters.  
 
Is it possible to ‘support the city’ through some kind of ‘economic patriotism’2 (Morgan, 
2012) that could enable governments to actively shape the economic development 
trajectories of their cities and urban regions? Does the economic history of the Gauteng 
urban region incorporate an industrial base strong enough to propel it to the status of a 
high performer? What kind of economic development trajectory emerges for Gauteng, 
since the adoption of its Global City-Region Strategic Perspective in 2006? Is it premised 
on a strategy that will not only reverse the region’s vulnerability to global shocks, but also 
launch it onto a sustainable high-growth path that will catapult it to the status of high 
global performers as a metropolitan region?  The research does not purport to provide 
answers to these important questions, but utilises them to frame the following primary 
research question:  
 
What is the location and positioning of industrialisation in the development agenda 
for Gauteng (2006-2011)? 
 
Industrialisation is the change in the production structure – industrial structure and related 
endowment structure – of the economy, resulting from and amounting to the reallocation 
of resources from low-productivity, diminishing returns activity sectors (e.g. agriculture, 
and other extractive sectors) to higher productivity, increasing returns activity sectors 
(especially manufacture). Economic development ‘is a process of continuous industrial 
and technological upgrading’ (Lin, 2012: 114), and as UNIDO (2009: xiii) argues ‘only in 
circumstances such as extraordinary abundance of land or resources have countries 
succeeded in developing without industrializing’. Such that the increased share in 
manufacturing output, employment, value-add, and exports; and the specific policies and 
institutions supporting such structural change are critical for economic development. For 
Khan (2009: 9), the challenge for developing countries like South Africa is ‘catching up’, 
by emulating economic structures of rich countries. 
 
1.3. Hypothesis 
 
In the period under review (2006 - 2011), there have been changes in political leadership 
at both provincial and local government levels, and several policies have since been 
adopted (see for example City of Johannesburg (CoJ), 2011; Gauteng Provincial 
Government (GPG), 2009). Some of the strategies, in particular the Gauteng Industrial 
Policy Framework (2010-2014) (Gauteng Department of Economic Development 
(GDED), 2010), emphasising manufacturing.  This arguably goes beyond a narrow focus 
on advanced services and finance as the main sectors for the envisaged future economy.  
The future economic development trajectory of the Gauteng urban region will depend on 
a number of related factors, including (a) how these strategies are to be aligned; (b) what 
                                                          
2
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policy levers are proposed and prioritised for intervening to direct economic 
development; (c) how the frictions of implementation unfold, and (d) the extent to which 
the regional and local states can (and choose to) direct investment choices and decisions. 
These combined factors could potentially determine whether the province continues on a 
path of ‘premature de-industrialisation’ (Palma, 2005), or could alter the current trends so 
as to launch a sustainable development path.  
 
1.4. Research Aims/Objectives 
 
The research intends to illuminate the meaning, materiality and potential impact of the 
Gauteng Global City Region agenda on the character and trajectory of Gauteng’s future 
economy. It focuses more specifically on the concept (what is entailed), character 
(sectors, industries, policy levers), and role (in economic growth and development) of 
industrialisation in the transition to that future economy. Within the ambits of this broader 
aim, the research is underpinned by the following objectives: 
 
(a) To analyse how industrialisation is accounted for in the emerging development 
trajectory; and in doing so:  
(b) To explore what the existing analysis is of the economic development level, trends 
and patterns; 
(c) To analyse the ‘theory’ of economic development (system of accumulation) 
emerging from the selected body of local and regional strategies;  and 
(d) To delineate the envisaged role of the regional and local states in economic 
development in the urban region. 
 
The outcome will be an improved understanding of the concept (what is entailed), 
character (sectors, industries, policy levers), and role (in economic growth and 
development) of industrialisation in the transition to the urban region’s future economy. 
Gauteng is the economic hub of the country; and the course of development it charts has 
implications for the country’s transition to a future economy; its place in the global 
economy, and the region’s own capacity to deal with the development challenges that 
beset it. 
 
1.5. Preliminary Literature Survey and Core Sources 
 
The study will draw from a varied set of literature, primarily the following: 
 
 World cities/Global cities: an emerging hierarchy of elite cities and their 
characteristics (Friedmann, 1995a; Knox, 1995a; Sassen, 2001). It will be 
important here to track the evolution of the concept, as the economics it proposes 
has narrowed with its evolution (see Hall, 2002). The debates within the literature 
have equally pointed to the limitations of the literature with respect to (a) its 
relevance for urban regions and cities of the South (see for example Robinson, 
2006; Metileni; 2006); (b) the inadequacies of hierarchies for explaining specific 
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city dynamics (Sassen, 2009c; 2011); and (c) the omission of other economic 
activities beyond finance and services in such schemas (Kratke, 2012).  
 
 Competitive city-regionalism: the elevation of the sub-national scale, the urban 
region more specifically, as a locus and focus of economic activity and political 
control following the post-1970s of state territoriality (Scott, 2002; 2003; 2007; 
Storper, 1995; Pike et al., 2006; see Brenner, 1998a on denationalisation). This 
elevation of the region as a critical player in its own right in the global economy 
(termed new regionalism), shifts emphasis away from diversionary central state 
policies whose intention was to balance development between different regions in 
a given country (old regionalism) (see Rogerson, 2009 for a detailed review; and 
Lovering, 1999; McLeod, 2001; Ward and Jonas, 2004). Under new regionalism, 
redistribution is only secondary, after all economic opportunity, across all scales 
(subnational, national, and supranational), locates unevenly across space, 
producing prosperous regions and lagging ones (The World Bank, 2009). It is the 
notion of the competitive global city region (Scott, 2010), and arguments about 
the economic development of these regions anchored in the works of Scott and 
Storper in particular (see for example Scott and Storper, 1987; 1990; 1992; 2003) 
that will be analysed here. This analysis is critical for a region (the Gauteng city-
region) which is arguably the most prosperous in the country, and is a target of 
experimentation with policy propositions linked with new regionalism.  
 
 Late-comer industrialisation: the role of the state in development, forms of 
intervention beyond the ‘getting prices right’ logic, and ‘bringing production 
back-in’. Although much of the research around this has focused mainly on the 
national scale (for example, Amsden, 2001; Chang, 2010), there are limited efforts 
to apply the developmental state lens to the city scale in relation to the global city 
literature (Haila, 2000; Hill and Kim, 2000; Yeung and Olds, 2001). Given this 
limitation, this literature will be explored not to explain city development 
processes more specifically, but to locate the role of industrialisation in 
development, and the role of the state in that process.  
 
1.6. Research Approach and Method 
 
The research approach will be exploratory and qualitative.  Qualitative research ‘involves 
looking at characteristics or qualities that cannot easily be reduced to numerical values’ 
and ‘typically aims to examine the many nuances and complexities of a particular 
phenomenon’ (Leedy and Ormrod, 2010: 94).  An exploration of the location and 
positioning of industrialisation of the Gauteng city region’s development path, especially 
if done through a review of state economic policies, cannot be reduced to numerical 
values if richer insights are to be generated.     
 
It will apply discourse analysis to deconstruct public (economic) policies adopted in 
Gauteng in the period since the adoption of the Gauteng Global City Region Strategy 
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(2006-2011). This will entail ‘a detailed and systematic examination of the contents of a 
particular body of material for the purpose of identifying patterns, themes, or biases’ 
(Leedy and Ormrod, 2010: 144).The particular body of material comprises an array of 
policies, strategies, plans and reports that relate directly to economic development in the 
Gauteng Provincial Government and its three Metropolitan municipalities. Semi-
structured interviews will be conducted with select officials and politicians within the 
local and provincial spheres
3
, their respective agencies
4
, and a number of experts in the 
field. Judgment sampling or purposeful sampling will be used to select the interviewees. 
This is a form of qualitative sampling where the researcher ‘actively selects the most 
productive sample to answer the research question’ (Marshall, 1996:523). 
 
1.7. Structure 
 
Chapter one introduces the research. It outlines the research question, aim and objectives, 
approach and method, and research report structure. The remainder of the research report 
is organised into three sections, which can be summed up more generically as literature 
review (A), the Gauteng case (B), and conclusions (C).  
 
Section A, comprising of three chapters, unravels the theoretical scaffolding upon which 
the rest of the research report is constructed, on the relationship between global cities, 
urban regions and the catch up problem for developing countries (and their urban 
regions).  
Chapter two (the first in this section) explores the concepts of world/global cities, their 
contribution to and limitations as analytical devices in urban studies of the role of cities in 
the global economy.  
Chapter three is an exposition of the features and fissures of competitive regionalism - 
that body of literature from which the notion of global city regions emerged.  
Chapter four concludes the section, focusing on the centrality of industrialisation in 
structural transformation for developing countries, generating a kind of competitiveness 
that the global cities (and regions) literature omits to theorise.  
Section B, chapter five, explores the GCR case study. It does so through an analysis of the 
emergence and evolution of the concept of global cities (and global city region) within the 
specific context of Gauteng. The path taken by Johannesburg (most prominent local 
economy) and Ekurhuleni (the manufacturing centre) metropolitan municipalities, 
culminating in the adoption of the Global City Region agenda in 2006 are traced. The 
economic policy package emerging between 2006 and 2011 will be outlined. The detailed 
picture of development thinking (in relation to industrialisation) in Gauteng provides 
material basis for the analysis in chapter four.  
                                                          
3
 From the  Economic Development Departments, the Strategy Offices (e.g. Office of the Premier, the Central 
Strategy Unit in CoJ)  
4
 Gauteng Growth and Development Agency (GGDA), Gauteng City-Region Observatory (GCRO) 
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Section C, concludes the research report, with summative notes and pointers for policy 
and research. 
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SECTION A: Globalisation: Accumulation Regimes, Territorial Moments, and the Catch-
up Problem 
 
The State’s role in favour of foreign or transnational capital heightens the uneven 
development of capitalism within each country in which foreign capital is reproduced. 
It does this most notably by designating particular regions as ‘development areas’ to 
the detriment of certain others—a process which […] produces fissures in the national 
unity underpinning the bourgeois State.  (Poulantzas, 1978: 213). 
 
The economic crisis of the 1970s triggered a series of restructuring moments and processes in 
the organisation and content - spatial, scalar, institutional, socio-political and economic - of 
global capitalism. These moments and processes, contested in their nature, are argued to have 
amounted to the (a) denationalization of state territoriality, in a new scalar rule-regime where 
‘no single scale serves as the primary pivot for accumulation, regulation, or sociopolitical 
struggle’ (Brenner and Theodore, 2002: 16); (b) resurgence of cities and urban regions as the 
preferred spatial fixes for the latest round of capital accumulation (Brenner, 1999); (c) 
emergence of the post-Keynesian competition states which at a local level have ushered in an 
entrepreneurial as opposed to managerial approach to urban governance (Harvey, 1989; 
Leitner, 1990; Jessop and Sum, 2000; Ward, 2003); (d) the rise of finance (or 
financialisation) and producer services as the primary sectors driving economic growth and 
development (Sassen, 2001; 2009a; Palley, 2007; Lapavitsas, 2011); and relatedly (e) the 
dominance of neoliberalism as the prevalent tendency patterning restructuring (Arestis and 
Sawyer, 2004; Harvey, 2005; Fine, 2009; Brenner et al., 2010).  
 
The first has to do with rescaling; the second with the privileging of specific spaces within 
the national space economy; the third the form, degree and content of state ‘intervention’; the 
fourth the shifting composition and organisation of economic activity; and the fifth the 
political ideas underpinning the restructuring. Central and foundational to these developments 
has been the rapid globalisation of production facilities; the ‘transnationalization in the 
ownership and control of major corporations through foreign direct investment, mergers and 
acquisitions, and joint ventures’ (Sassen, 2001: 26); and the rise of information and 
communication technologies which increased the scale, pace and (concomitantly the) 
complexity of transactions globally. Cities and urbanized regions more generally are 
implicated as central arenas in the unfolding, enabling, constraining, and/or patterning of 
these developments; making them prominent architects in and products of the latest round of 
capitalist development. 
 
Drawing from the literature on world cities, global cities, and global city regions as entry 
points; the section argues that the various developments summed above (i.e. 
denationalization, cities and urban regions as preferred spatial fixes, competitiveness as the 
new rule system, financialisation (as) neoliberalism) are in fact interlinked and constitutive of 
each other. And that it is in drawing the sometimes disjunctive literature dedicated to 
explorations of each theme into relations that the policy practices and research agendas 
emerging from world/global city (regions) literature can be analyzed more systematically.  
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This section, comprised of three chapters, unravels the theoretical scaffolding upon which the 
rest of the research report will be assembled, on the relationship between urban regions and 
the catch up problem for developing countries (and their urban regions). Chapter two 
explores the concepts of world/global cities, their contribution to and limitations as analytical 
devices in urban studies of the role of cities in the global economy. Chapter three is an 
exposition of the features and fissures of competitive regionalism - that body of literature 
from which the notion of global city regions emerged. Chapter four focuses on the centrality 
of industrialisation in structural transformation for developing countries, generating a kind of 
competitiveness that the global cities (and regions) literature omits to theorise. 
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Chapter 02: From World (Global) Cities to Worlding (Globalising) Cities 
 
2.1. Introduction 
 
The term ‘world city’ has been deployed historically to designate those cities that served as 
nerve centers of the world economy at a given point in the evolution of global capitalism 
(Hall, 1966; Braudel, 1984; King, 1990). The development of such cities is best studied in 
its longue duree context (Taylor, 1995). As will be seen below, the paradox is that as 
research on the world city gained currency over the years (see Hall, 1966), the 
contemporary has come to dominate, and the attributes argued to distinguish world cities 
have narrowed (more so in theory than in policy).  
 
The vast and diverse literature can be roughly clustered into five approaches (Beaverstock 
et al., 2000; Hall, 2002) in accordance with the primary object of study central to 
determining world/global cities, namely (a) the role and locational preferences of 
multinational corporations (MNCs) in the developed world (Hall, 1996; Hymer, 1972); (b) 
MNCs, in particular their decision-making corporate activities and powers, in the late-1970s 
new international division of labour (NIDL) (Friedmann and Wolff, 2006; Friedmann, 
1995a); (c) financial centers (Reed, 1981); (d) producer services, their internationalization, 
concentration, and intensity in the world economy (here MNCs headquarters are no longer 
critical) (Sassen, 1991, 2000a); and (e) relationships, as opposed to attributes – from 
hierarchies to networks (Beaverstock et al., 2000; Globalisation and World Cities Study 
Group: www.lboro.ac.uk/gawc/). In all these, however delineated, world cities are argued to 
be the command centers and basing points of the global economy.   
 
This chapter does not attempt a comprehensive review of this burgeoning and multifaceted 
literature (see Friedmann, 1995a; Keil and Brenner, 2006 for generous reviews), but isolates 
the second (world city hypothesis) and forth (global city) strands for closer scrutiny. These 
two are arguably the most influential in the literature, precisely because of their extensive 
circulation as models shaping research (around the relations between the cities and the 
global economy), and city development policy across the globe (Robinson, 2006). 
Reflections on the key elements, hypotheses, and arguments distinguishing these selected 
strands are the focus of the next two sections. The discussion is followed by a brief critique 
of this literature, in a section that posits that its focus on a limited set of economic activities 
occludes a critical analysis of other aspects, activities and phases of economic development. 
Cities are better studied as simultaneously globalising and global, as both processes and 
end-states. The fourth section reflects on some of Sassen’s post-2008 crisis writings, which 
(convincingly) argue that the specialised differences of cities matter in today’s global 
economy, and that such specialised differences are largely a product of each cities deep 
complex economic history. The chapter concludes with an argument that globalising cities 
(including their rise and fall) cannot be understood outside of the dynamics of their 
production structures, and the specific policies and institutions supporting them.     
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2.2.1. The World City Hypothesis 
 
The study of urbanisation was revolutionarised when urban studies began to draw linkages 
between urbanisation and industrial capitalism (Friedmann, 1995a) - simultaneously 
embedding the global economy into actual spatial contexts, and economic relations and 
dynamics into urban change (Castells, 1972; Harvey, 1973).The work of these neo-Marxists, 
and of world system theories, and other radical readings of global capitalism, provided 
analytical foundations for scholarship on world cities emerging in later years (Brenner and 
Keil, 2006), with Friedmann’s (1995a) world city hypothesis a foundational paper (also see 
Hall, 1966).  
  
For Friedmann (1995a: 21-22), the world city hypothesis is experimental, both as ‘a way of 
asking questions about cities in general’ and ‘a statement about a class of particular cities’. In 
general guise, it refers to cities and their integration into the world economy, and it is specific 
to a class of cities in so far as it elevates for scrutiny those cities whose integration into world 
economy is sufficient to qualify them as ‘commanding nodes of the global system’.  
  
According to this hypothesis, the differences between and among cities can be attributed 
primarily to their mode of integration into the global economy. Accordingly, cities are 
assigned functions in the new international division of labour (and by extension a place in the 
hierarchy of cities). This new international division of labour is a precondition for and an 
outcome of the post-Fordist accumulation regime. Functions refer more specifically to the 
composition and concentration of economic activities in a given city, discernible from the 
‘structure and dynamics of the production sectors and employment’ (Friedmann, 1995b: 322). 
They do not only determine the nature and depth and duration of a city’s integration into the 
global economy, they also shape the structural changes - spatial and socio-economic (e.g. 
industry structure, spatial form, capital flows) - unfolding within the given city. In fact, urban 
change largely results from adaptations to external forces (Friedmann, 1995b).  
 
With production, circulation and exchange variously fixed in the spatialities of cities, it is 
possible to map a spatial hierarchy of cities according ‘to the economic power they 
command’ (Friedmann, 1995a: 23). Even then, volatilities in the world economy do not allow 
for fixed stable hierarchies (ibid, 23). Hence, those cities assigned more command and 
control functions
5
 constitute the apex of this hierarchy, defined as world cities for their 
centrality to the global space of accumulation (ibid). It is these functions, external to cities, 
which cities must strive to attract into their localities. For the ability to attract global 
investments (read command and control functions) is the ultimate determinant of the rank a 
city comes to occupy in the spatial hierarchy of cities (Friedmann, 1995a). 
 
                                                          
5
 Command and control functions, termed by Friedmann and Wolff (2006: 61) the ‘chief economic functions of 
the world city’, refers here to management; banking and finance; legal services; accounting; technical 
consulting; telecommunications and computing; international transportation; research; and higher education.  
20 |  
 
The world city hierarchy’s selection criteria (attributes) has not always been confined to 
command and control functions; ‘world cities’ have in an earlier endeavor (Friedmann,1995b: 
320) included: ‘major financial centre; headquarters for TNCs (including regional 
headquarters); international institutions; rapid growth and development of business services 
sector; important manufacturing centre; major transportation node; population size’. 
However, it is finance, transnational corporations’ headquarters, and business services that 
were to later generate a substantial body of research (Globalization and World Cities, 
www.lboro.ac.uk/gawc). Drawing from the world-systems theory, the hierarchy generated 
departs from a core-periphery delimitation of cities; arguing that world city formation is 
limited only to the core and semi-periphery (Friedmann and Wolff, 2006). 
 
This treatment of cities here as simply passive recipients of some functions - assigned to 
them by the latest round of global capitalism - owes to the declaration that ‘we [must be] 
talking about places and sites rather than actors’ (Friedmann, 1995a: 22; original emphasis). 
It is not the cities that are actors, but rather ‘transnational corporations’ who are ‘themselves 
in bitter and cannibalistic conflict for the control of economic space’ (Friedmann and Wolff, 
2006: 58). 
 
Although Friedmann did not proceed to build on this experimental hypothesis, it was 
pioneering in mapping a research agenda that has since dominated urban studies. One of the 
critical threads is the ‘global city’ to which the chapter now turns.   
 
2.2.2. Global City 
 
It was Saskia Sassen (2000a) who invested extensively into reading the emergent city of the 
post-Fordist regime. She coins the concept of ‘global city’ to describe and analyse the rise of 
some cities as sites of production, marketing, servicing, and innovation of a type critical for a 
transformed, services and finance-led global economy (Sassen, 2001). A key feature of the 
present phase in the history of the world economy - the increased mobility and liquidity of 
capital associated with rise in information technologies (Sassen, 2005) - the global cities 
research originates from a concern with analysing the ‘territorial moment’ in the digitization 
and globalisation of the operations of firms and markets (Sassen, 2009a).   
 
2.2.2.1. Evicting ‘the narrative of eviction’ 
  
Such an analysis departs necessarily from a systematic critique of mainstream conceptions of 
globalisation and the information economy, which argue that developments in information 
and communications technology have rendered territory, place and borders irrelevant (Sassen, 
2007). Dubbing this mainstream conception the ‘narrative of eviction’; she argues that 
celebrating global transmissions ignores the material infrastructure upon which the 
transmissions are premised; and that it is workers located in place that produce information 
outputs that are said to be placeless (Sassen, 2000).  
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While increased capital mobility and liquidity plus digitization do reconfigure in significant 
ways the geographic organisation of manufacturing, finance and services and their respective 
markets, there are material infrastructures, processes, and activities upon which dispersal (i.e. 
the multiplication of production sites and finance markets) is premised. These material 
infrastructures represent new concentrations required to debug, manage, service (and by 
extension enable) such dispersal. In essence, while the compression of space-time ushered in 
by the advances in telecommunications technology have facilitated the rapid globalisation of 
firms and their production facilities; the speeds and complexities that result necessitate the 
spatial fixing of command and control functions for these firms.  
 
Thus, she posits that the central logic in the formation of the global city is that the added 
speed, uncertainties, and changeability of operations of digitised and globalised firms and 
markets require agglomerations of highly specialised capabilities designed to handle them 
(Sassen, 2004). Contending thus that place (or at least specific types of places) matters. This, 
geographical/spatial stickiness, is the most ‘crucial logic in the formation of global cities’, 
whose ‘economic function’ ‘has to do with the capabilities to manage, implement, innovate, 
debug and service the global operations of firms and markets’ (ibid: 1).  
 
2.2.2.2. Command and control 
 
The implementation and management of the global economic system require organisational 
commodities, found in finance and corporate producer services (Sassen, 2006a). The latter 
are the highly specialized capabilities referred to above. The outsourcing by producer firms of 
complex command and control corporate functions (MacDonald, 2008); and the growth of 
producer services and expansion of services companies have over time amounted to a ‘new 
economic regime’, an ascending specialised services-led economy (Sassen, 2006a: 85). This 
is a ‘new economic regime’ because these sectors impose themselves upon the rest of the 
economy, in the process devalorising manufacturing and other low value-added services 
(Sassen, 2001); services and finance are argued to constitute the dominant ensemble in the 
latest round of global capitalism. 
 
These (finance and producer) services are ‘overvalorised’ - celebrated for their ‘super-profit 
making capacity’ (Sassen, 2000b: 84). This capacity evolves from a combination of (a) 
developments in technology that have enabled capital to be hypermobile; (b) the deregulation 
of markets that have multiplied the number of outlets for this hypermobile capital; (c) the 
proliferation of financial instruments that can now be traded in the market; (d) the demand for 
services by growing numbers of producing firms that have otherwise outsourced their own 
command and control functions; and (e) the increased complexity and resultant specialization 
in the nature of producer services (Sassen, 2006a).  
 
The production of producer services is not dependent much on buyers (like consumer 
services) as it in on proximity to a series of other services. This is strategic for access to 
critical inputs and possibilities for joint ventures. The networks that emerge when service 
firms locate in close proximity allow each firm to attain and maintain a competitive position 
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in the market. As McDonald (2008, 20) sums it, to be ‘outside of this spatial loop is to create 
inherent inefficiencies in productivity, to risk missing out on crucial information, or to be 
shut out altogether from lucrative business opportunities with correlated firms’. 
Consequently, agglomerations of producer service firms arise. The logic for the formation of 
these agglomerations is increasing speed, as opposed to minimizing the costs of weight and 
frictions distance (Sassen, 2004).  
 
Similarly, while acknowledging the importance of a strong manufacturing sector for the 
growth of producer services, Sassen (2006b) contends that (a) the location of manufacturing 
firms is of secondary importance as they still require the specialised producer services 
wherever they are located; and (b) a substantial part of the producer services sector is 
independent of (e.g. financial business transactions) and/or only marginally/incidentally 
engaged with manufacturing (e.g. mergers and acquisitions). The producer services
6
 sector 
must thus be conceived not as a ‘residual category’ but as an important sector in its own right 
(Sassen, 2000a). The hitherto dismissal of services as a residual category, an error made by 
both neoclassical and Keynesian economics (Sassen, 2000a: 92), is premised on a 
problematic assumption that services are ‘non-stockable, nontransportable, and not subject to 
mass production or scale economies’ (ibid: 96).  
 
But the growth of and increased specialization in the services sector starting in the 1980s has 
meant that the producer services industry is freestanding, and contributes to rising shares of 
GNP [Gross National Product] (Sassen, 2000a). A number of factors contribute to the growth 
in the demand for the specialised intermediate inputs that are producer services. They include 
growth in the size, complexity and diversification of firms; mergers and acquisitions and the 
resultant separation of functions and geographical dispersal of economic activity; product 
differentiation and the resulting market differentiation; the dynamism and complexity of the 
business environment; and the growth in multinational corporations. Producer services as a 
result have become tradable, and subject to scale economies; coming to constitute a very 
critical sector in their own right. 
   
2.2.2.3. Specialisation and hierarchy  
 
New York, London and Tokyo constitute the apex in the global hierarchy of the 
‘postindustrial production sites’ that are global cities. They represent huge concentrations of 
financial and producer services, having a high share of transactions and markets, of producer 
services firms, top global banks, and securities houses (Sassen, 2000a, 190-191). The various 
ensembles of producer services located in cities do not only operate at the level of intra-city 
networks within local agglomerations, but also embed themselves within networks of similar 
ensembles in other cities - producing the ‘nodal points that function as control centers for the 
interdependent skein of material, financial, and cultural flows which, together, support and 
sustain globalization’ (Knox, 1995a: 236). The connectivities emerging entail a degree of 
                                                          
6
 So termed to distinguish them from consumer services (which are produced for individualized consumption), 
and to specify them as services produced for firms and organisations as intermediate inputs into the production 
process (from manufacturing to agriculture to services) (Sassen, 2000a)       
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cooperation (as opposed to competition) among these ensembles. These firms, and the 
markets spawned by them, require a state of the art infrastructures not located in a single city, 
but instead in a network of cities. It is the complexity of command and control functions, 
necessitating specialization in a division of these functions between different cities that allow 
more cities to play an increasingly important role as finance and services centres.  
 
 2.3. Worlding Cities
7
 
 
‘Worlding’ is a call for studying the laws of motion – for studying the world-in-formation, 
and the diverse projects and practices that allow cities (in their own way) to participate in 
such formation (Ong, 2011: 11). It is these laws of motion that are lacking in the literature, 
reducing global cities and their hierarchies to fixed categories of appearance. The focus 
(especially in the global city concept) on finance and producer services ignores other aspects 
(health, education, etc), activities (e.g. mining, manufacturing), and phases (e.g. agrarian 
transformation, industrialisation) of economic development. Given the limited geographical 
purchase (their concentration in few cities) and detrimental socio-economic consequences of 
finance and producer services (unemployment and widening inequality for instance), this 
omission from the global city analytical framework is indeed a critical one.  
 
The mechanisms of economic dynamism need to be correctly diagnosed, including 
identifying the growth characteristics and potentialities embodied in the different types of 
economic activities. These potentialities relate to their ability to generate increasing returns, 
generate and/or exploit technological change and produce synergies; and consequently their 
contribution to cumulative causations and structural change for a given economy (Reinert, 
2007). As a result, the specific economic histories of cities and the path-dependence of their 
trajectories cannot be ignored. Financialisation and the increasing service-orientation, 
processes at the heart of the command and control functions that make up global cities, have 
for example been in several cases coupled with and/or premised on premature de-
industrialisation in cases (see for example Palma, 2005). 
 
In a context of uneven development, countries and their cities are differentially positioned in 
global commodity chains and investment flows, with varying contributions in value and 
volume to global trade. Hierarchies based solely on concentrations of producer services and 
finance drop many cities and regions off the map of the global economy, ‘consigning 
substantial areas of the globe to structural irrelevance’ (Robinson, 2002: 536). As if 
development were a frozen end-state (as opposed to a dynamic process), Knox (1995a: 15, 
emphasis added) writes of ‘a phase of world development in which the mega-cities of the 
periphery will fare no better than the catatonic agrarian societies that have fuelled their 
(demographic) growth, and in which both will lapse decisively and irretrievably into a “slow” 
economic time zone’.  
 
                                                          
7
 Worlding Cities: Asian Experiments and the Art of Being Global is the title of a critical book on Asian global 
city experiments and the implications for theory (Roy and Ong, 2011).  
24 |  
 
But cities outside the core have emerged over the past decade or two as critical players in the 
global economy (see Hill and Kim, 2000; Burdett and Sudjic, 2011; Roy and Ong, 2011), 
each with production structures distinct from those of London and New York. Their 
prominence is explicated by processes other than financialisation, for example by 
industrialisation that explain much of late-comer catch up (Hill and Kim, 2000; Amsden, 
2001). Even concentrations of producer services and finance cannot in these cities be 
celebrated apart from latecomer industrialisation (and industrial policy plus finance 
embedded in a developmental state) and the resultant economic base (Hill and Kim, 2000). 
Such a conclusion brings the state back into analysis of world city formation and the global 
economy, a glaring omission in the world cities literature.  
 
That the literature on global cities does not address the role of the state and of national 
interest in world city formation (ibid, 2187) might be accounted for by the fact that even 
‘globalisation’ itself remains a poorly defined and inadequately problematised in the 
literature (McDonald, 2008; but see Sassen, 2007). Consequently, the focus on the success 
and dynamism of a (few sectors in a) few cities of the North circumscribes the explanatory 
power of the world city/global city concepts, in that they cannot account for development 
experiments (failed or successful) of cities elsewhere. As Ong (2011: 3) correctly argues, the 
2008 crisis exposed the fact that ‘the political economic focus on city functions cannot 
account for the sudden economic collapse of heretofore global cities or for the rapid rise of 
major Asian cities of global significance’.   
 
2.4. From Cities to Circuits: A partial rejoinder 
 
Cautious and reflective, Sassen (2009a; 2009c; 2011) writes post-2008 about cities in the 
global age, whose specialised differences and economic histories matter. She argues that the 
types of global cities emerging differ because of the differences in the preferences of firms 
and in levels of specialisation and chosen product markets. Such differences mediate against 
competition between cities, and allow for development of alliances between those cities 
operating within similar global circuits. After all, there is no such an object as ‘the global 
economy’, only global (inter-city) circuits (of firms and markets) connecting particular cities 
in very specific ways – producing ‘inter-city geographies’ (Sassen, 2009c).   
 
It is possible then to generate not just a map of global cities, but different maps of different 
circuits and cities, dislodging earlier hierarchies privileging (specific aspects of) finance and 
producer services. Indeed, ‘[s]pecialized circuits in gold, coffee, oil, and other commodities 
involve particular places, which vary depending on whether they are production circuits, 
trading circuits, or financial circuits’ (Sassen, 2009a: 6). Even within the same circuits, places 
are responsible for different segments. For example, it is Chicago (and not New York and 
London) that dominates in the trading of futures, despite the dominance of the latter as the 
leading financial centers of the world. Sao Paulo, Johannesburg and Sydney dominate in the 
wholesale trade of gold as a metal; while New York, Chicago and Zurich dominate in global 
circuits of gold as a financial instrument.  
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Consequently, each city is located on some of many circuits, different and specific (Sassen, 
2009a). Each city’s particular and highly specialised capabilities are what matters in the 
global economy, such that the economic history of each city becomes a critical determinant 
of the kind of role it plays in the so-called knowledge economy. The deep economic history 
of a city is ‘one key source of its competitive advantage’ (ibid: 24), and as such global city 
Shanghai can never be the same as global city London. A multipolar world is emerging, and 
firms and markets require diverse capabilities located in different circuits and cities. And 
because no single city can provide all these capabilities across circuits and segments, no city 
ranks at the top of all circuits. There is no perfect global city, only many global cities 
anchoring the global economy differentially and specifically. Global firms, therefore, are 
most likely to find the resources they require for navigating the specificities of national 
economies in global cities, different and particular.  
 
2.5. Concluding Notes: Towards Dialectical Urbanism 
 
In the end, each city is ‘at once a thing and a process’, an experience and its production, and 
cannot be conceptualized as either/or, but as ‘both simultaneously’ (Merrifield, 2002: 159, 
original emphasis). The study of the role of cities in the global economy must necessarily 
commence with an understanding that cities have their specialised differences and histories 
(Sassen, 2009c). Such an understanding dislodges global city hierarchies in favour of 
investigating the deep complex economic histories of cities, and how such histories pattern 
their current role in the global space of accumulation.  
 
Cities everywhere, and not just a few elite cities in the North, become critical archives for 
generating theories about the role of cities in the world economy, and models for 
development beyond the limiting post-industrial city vision of producer services and finance. 
The various aspects, activities and phases of economic development are brought into lucid 
view. The measure of a global city status ceases to be concentrations of finance and producer 
services firms, shifting focus instead to unravelling factors that ignite and sustain economic 
development. These factors, which differ in some measure within developing countries and 
those of developed countries (and their cities respectively), relate to ‘the dynamics of 
production structures’ and ‘the specific policies and institutions created to support’ them 
(Ocampo, 2005: 4)
8
.  
 
While Johannesburg has featured prominently in the restricted and restrictive maps of world 
and global cities emerging (Friedmann, 1995a; Beaverstock et al., 1999; Sassen, 2009), its 
global city status has yet to be investigated within the context of its deep complex economic 
history, and the implications of its current trajectory for catch up. Building on this and the 
two subsequent chapters (on global city-regions and on the catch up problem), this study 
intends to partially close this critical gap.    
  
                                                          
8
 See Chapter four  for a detailed discussion  
26 |  
 
Chapter 03: Competitive City-Regionalism: Features and Fissures 
3.1. Introduction 
 
Old regionalism is a product of the 1950s Western Europe, concerned with balanced 
development across the national space economy (Rogerson, 2009). Redistributive and 
diversionary policies - including infrastructure investments, grants and tax incentives, and 
physical controls - were adopted by national governments in pursuit of balanced development 
to divert investment into lagging regions. But the expected economic returns following these 
interventions were not realized. The nation state’s command over macro-economic policy and 
other instruments for intervention, and the increasing questioning of industrialisation as a 
driver of modernization for lagging regions combined to undermine the project of old 
regionalism starting in the 1970s.  
 
New regionalism is a response to changes in the global economy, where the region is the 
primary actor, and national scale directing and planning policies are reduced in significance 
(ibid). The region thus anchors economic and social life, embodies political authority and 
economic regulation, and is an asset for learning-based competitive advantage and 
associational economies (McLeod, 2001). Here the focus is building the competitiveness of 
already thriving regions and not balanced development, it is in the global economy and not 
the nation-state that provides the parameters and capabilities for regional development 
(Rogerson, 2009).  
 
Although there are different strands and thematic foci in the new regionalism literature (see 
McLeod, 2001; Rogerson, 2009, for reviews), and substantial criticism levelled against it; the 
focus of this chapter is literature focused on the global economic competitiveness of regions. 
More specifically the numerous interventions by Scott and Stopper (see for example: Scott 
and Storper, 1987; 1990; 1992; 2003; Scott: 2001; 2006; Storper: 1995; 1998; 2010), 
reflecting jointly and individually on the flexible accumulation regime and its spatial 
dynamics, at the centre of which is the region as a foundational territorial platform for 
competitiveness. It is the features and fissures of the ‘competitive city-regionalism’ espoused 
by this literature that is the subject of the remainder of the chapter.       
  
In the next section, this chapter delineates the literature’s point of departure, an analysis of 
capitalism and its evolution as a series of regimes of accumulation and associated but 
differentiated modes of social regulation.  The current accumulation regime, the literature 
suggests, is a post-Fordist regime characterised as flexible accumulation, which is the focus 
of the subsequent section. The leading industrial ensembles, spatial dynamics (clustering and 
agglomeration tendencies), institutions and conventions, and policy implications of flexible 
accumulation as an accumulation regime and its associated modes of social regulation are 
briefly outlined. This section, the third in the chapter, is basically an attempt at a summary of 
competitive city-regionalism’s most salient features. The fourth section turns to the 
limitations of competitive city-regionalism, exposing its fissures as a theoretical device and 
analytical tool, and as a policy agenda.  
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3.2. The point of departure: on regimes and modes  
 
The institution of commodity production (and its logic of accumulation)
9
 - at the centre of 
capitalism as a mode of production - assumes different concrete shapes at different moments 
in history (Scott, 2004). These concrete shapes, are manifestations of geographically-, 
historically-specific combinations of ‘sociotechnical relations through which commodity 
outputs are secured, the economic surplus appropriated, and new investments ploughed back 
into the sphere of production’ (ibid: 126). The particular sociotechnical combinations and the 
concrete shapes of the institution of commodity production; constitute in Regulationist theory 
‘regimes of accumulation’10 and their underpinning ‘modes of social regulation’11. These 
technological-institutional systems are comprised in (a) an evolving technological and 
organizational structure of production; (b) labour markets and industrial relations; managerial 
cultures and norms; (c) market structures and forms of competition; and (d) regulatory 
institutions at various levels (sectoral, regional, national and international) (Scott and Storper: 
1990; 1992). 
 
The internal tensions and contradictions characteristic of capitalism as a mode of production, 
and the restructurings ushered in as crisis–displacement resolution mechanisms; largely 
account for the dissolution (even if partial) of the old and the emergence of new accumulation 
regimes and modes of social regulation. Whereas the modes of social regulation may differ 
for any given regime of accumulation, and although there are inevitably continuities and 
discontinuities as the old dissolves and the new emerges; different technological-institutional 
systems can be distinguished through the peculiarities of the specific ‘ensembles of leading 
industries’ and the complementary but differentiated quasi-political arrangements steering the 
economy (Scott and Storper, 1992). An ensemble is dominant when its component industries 
(a) account (directly and indirectly) for a disproportionately higher share of total 
employment; (b) have very high growth rates of output and/or employment; (c) are the 
significant focus of innovation and new investment; (d) have propulsive effects in upstream 
sectors; and (e) generate technological organisational and/or managerial practices that soon 
become the desired actual norm in the rest of the economy (Scott and Storper, 1987; 1990).  
 
As each regime of accumulation and mode of social regulation is premised on a specific 
geography of production, transitions from one to the next involve some ‘radical switch in the 
spatial bases of production from one set of core regions to another’ (Scott and Storper, 
                                                          
9 As Karl Marx (Marx, 2011 [1906], 41) sums it in the first volume of Capital: ‘The wealth of those 
societies in which the capitalist mode of production prevails, presents itself as ‘an immense accumulation 
of commodities’.  
10 A regime of accumulation refers to ‘a systematic and long-term allocation of the product in such a way 
as to ensure a certain adequation between transformations of conditions of production and 
transformations of conditions of consumption’ (Lipietz, 1987: 32) 
11 The mode of regulation refers to the ‘institutional forms, procedures and habits which either coerce or 
persuade private agents to conform to’ an accumulation regime’s ‘schemas of social reproduction’ 
(Lipietz, 1987: 33) 
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1992:6). This switch is evidenced most visibly in ‘cases where the ascending leading sectors 
of the new system are free of any dependence on the immobile resources of the old’12.  
 
3.3. The Post-Fordist Regime: Flexible Accumulation 
 
On the back of this theoretical scaffolding of changing accumulation regimes and associated 
modes of regulation, embodied in dominant ensembles and related territorial structures; Scott 
and Storper (1990; 1992; 2004; Scott, 2004) argue that flexible accumulation has emerged 
since the 1960s as the dominant regime of accumulation. At its core, the new regime is 
founded on forms of productive activity
13
 that are distinguished by their unprecedented 
ability to reconfigure processes and products, including upwards/downwards adjustment in 
output quantities while retaining high levels of productivity (Scott and Storper, 1990; Scott, 
2004).  
 
In the long crisis of Fordism, technologies have evolved and market conditions for particular 
products and services have altered, introducing uncertainty, contestability and complexity. 
Firms came to prefer building cost-reducing relations outside the boundaries of the firm (i.e. 
to externalize), leading to the proliferation of smaller specialized plants focused on small 
batch outputs, moving rapidly in and out of particular niche markets (Scott and Storper, 
1990). This ‘evident propensity’ of flexible production ensembles to ‘disintegrate into 
extended social divisions of labour [and in the process] giving rise to many specialized 
subsectors’ is a ‘reflection of the tendency of internal economies to give way before a 
progressive externalization of the structure of production under conditions of rising 
flexibility’ (Storper, 2004: 129). What emerge are network production structures imbued with 
external economies of scale and scope (Scott and Garofoli, 2007), marked by tendencies to 
spatial convergence and reagglomeration (Scott, 2004). Potent agglomeration economies 
evolve as these networks are locked into a dynamic framework where they ‘interact and 
evolve’ together with ‘local labour market structures’ and ‘innovation processes’ in ‘logic of 
circular and cumulative causation’ (Scott and Garofoli: 2007: 5).   
 
3.3.1. …its leading ensembles 
 
The ensembles (with their firms, sectors, and industries) dominant in the contemporary 
flexible accumulation regime are (a) artisanal, craft-based, and design–intensive (e.g. 
clothing, textiles, furniture, jewelry, ceramics); (b) high-technology industries, dependent on 
advanced engineering/scientific knowledge  (pharmaceuticals, bioengineering, advanced 
metallurgical industries, electronics, military and space hardware production); and (c) 
advanced producer and financial services (Scott and Storper, 1990;1992; Scott, 2004). Their 
transactional activities are intensive, extensive and non-standardised; local labour markets are 
fluid and flexible; and the producers involved are multiple, small- and medium–sized, and 
highly specialized (Scott and Storper, 1990:24). Their outputs are films, semiconductors, 
                                                          
12 See also Brenner and Theodore (2002: 7) on spatio-temporal fixes above 
13 Notwithstanding variations in the technologies, labour processes and outputs 
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banking and financial services, fashion, jewelry, and furniture production, inter alia (Scott et 
al., 2001). 
 
3.3.2. … its clustering and agglomeration tendencies     
 
New major products, processes and technologies emerging require sharing, matching and 
learning (Storper, 2010); and thus necessitate agglomeration, which lowers costs and widens 
opportunities for producers constantly matching needs and capabilities (Scott and Storper, 
1990). Clustering allows firms to navigate challenges by increasing their operational 
flexibility and bolstering their innovative capacities (Scott et al., 2001). This as a result of the 
rapid movement of changing information about technologies, markets, processes and product 
designs between the different firms in a given cluster (ibid).  
 
3.3.3. The institutions and conventions to sustain it 
 
The spatial proximity of firms, materialising through expanding clusters at the heart of 
specialised regional production systems or value chains, allow for critical product and/or 
process improvements that propel economies forward. But factors of production assembled in 
a physical space do not alone amount to economic development (Rogerson, 2009); and the 
efficiencies and dynamism of clusters therefore can only be realised and sustained if 
harnessed through institutions
14
 and conventions. These routines and untraded dependencies 
(of trust and reciprocity) allow for exploitation by firms of knowledge spillovers and 
externalities, in the process deepening sharing, matching and learning (Storper, 1995). These 
conventions and rules are necessary to counter market failures including externalities, 
imperfect information, free-rider problems inter alia in areas as varied as inter-firm 
transactions, technological innovation and transfer, local labour markets (skills and training), 
and community development and planning  (Scott and Storper, 1990; 1992). Consequently, 
the conventions ‘must be coherent, not only so that what is produced embodies endogenous 
learning, but also so that the resulting product passes external tests of competitiveness by 
being sold at prices and quantities sufficient to reproduce the system’ (Scott, 1998: 16, 
original emphasis).  
 
3.3.4. Its policy implications 
 
The policy threads emerging from this emphasis on institution building and conventions are 
summed in Storper (1998: 26-27) as (a) support for inter-establishment and inter-firm 
relations and networks; (b) establishment of publicly funded innovation and technology 
transfer centers ‘to enhance the adoption of new technologies’ and ‘stimulate convergence in 
user-producer relations’, so as to allow for rapid incremental innovation; (c) strategic public 
training; (d) industry-specific, precompetitive research and development (R&D) to stimulate 
infant industries in ‘risky new technology products’; (e) entrepreneurship policies to help 
                                                          
14
 Defined by Storper (1998: 22) as consisting of ‘persistent and connected sets of rules, formal and informal, 
that prescribe behavioural roles, constrain activity, and shape expectations’  
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potential entrepreneurs overcome difficulties such as limited access to capital; and (f) 
industry service centers providing resources such as systematic market research, foreign 
marketing, technology research, technology sharing and on-line networking opportunities. 
This ‘new heterodox policy paradigm’ has the twin goals of ‘ongoing adaptation of products 
and processes, especially through product differentiation or moves up the price-quality curve 
so as to respond to the ongoing and inevitable entry by competitors’ (applicable to traditional 
or small-scale intermediate products); and ‘movement along the technological frontier, where 
the frontier is unknown or unknowable’ (for scale-intensive or new technology products) 
(Storper, 1998: 29-30).        
 
3.3.5. Its regional motors 
 
In a context where locational proximity is coupled with conventions and institutions that 
generate learning and innovation, clustering leads to increased growth which, in turn, leads to 
further clustering, amounting to cumulative causation (Rogerson, 2009). It is city-regions, 
‘with their complex internal structures comprising multiple urban cores, extended suburban 
appendages and widely-ranging hinterland areas’ that represent for Scott and Storper (2003: 
S193) the ‘most striking forms of agglomerations in evidence today’. The varied networks 
that constitute the clusters and agglomerations at the heart of these regions are linked to 
networks in other regions of the world through trade and capital flows and value chains. 
Consequently, city-regions are located variously in the division of labour that comprises the 
territorial and political-economic architecture of the flexible accumulation regime.   
 
The emerging geography of the flexible accumulation regime is constituted by densely 
urbanised regional economic agglomerations (contra the national scale core-periphery 
arrangement of the Fordist regime). The dynamism of national economies depend largely on 
these regional agglomerations, because they are imbued with possibilities for learning and 
innovation, dense local labour markets and localized relational assets generated by the 
reagglomeration of production. They constitute a critical means to militate against the threats 
of globalisation while exploiting the opportunities it presents. In sum, the region has become 
a critical basing point, relational asset, and a source of learning-based competitive advantage, 
(MacLeod, 2001).  
 
3.4. Fissures: Limits to competitive city-regionalism 
 
Beyond the focus on agglomerations, their traded and untraded dependencies, and their 
assumed attendant innovation, learning and economic dynamism (i.e. high productivity and 
performance); new regionalism fails to engage with actual drivers of regional economic 
development (Ward and Jonas, 2004). The political and economic processes accounting for 
the resurgence of any given city-region as a motor in the global economy must necessarily be 
studied in their contingent and specific forms.  
 
Whereas city-regions are important sites of exchange and innovation and platform for 
development and competitiveness; redistribution, conflict, counter-strategies, and politics 
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remain critical (ibid). City-regions are thus not delinked from the political interests and 
alliances and conflicts within their national space economies, even as regional change is 
usually delinked in the literature from a wider political economy, which is marked by fiscal 
restraint and welfare retrenchment (MacLeod, 2001).     
 
The absence of a theorisation around politics of space and scale in new regionalism leads to 
the location of resurgent regions in some post-national state territoriality, where the national 
state is said to have been hollowed out to a point where (sub-national) regions grapple 
directly with the challenges of globalisation. Omitted from this perspective is the argument 
advanced by Brenner and Theodore (2002b) that the post-1970s rescaling has produced a new 
‘scalar fix’ which concentrates political control and economic activity variously within 
different scales (sub-, supra-, national). The restructured relations within the new hierarchy 
are such that the national might be dislodged as the primary state territorial container of 
capital accumulation, but there is ‘no single scale serves as the primary pivot for 
accumulation, regulation, or sociopolitical struggle’ (ibid: 16, emphasis added). 
 
The national state therefore, and its scale and scope of intervention remains critical, including 
it adopting policies that privilege specific regions within their national space-economy, even 
as ‘national economic autarchy becomes less significant than it once was’ (Scott and 
Garofoli, 2007: 4). There are many forces shaping the emergence and sustenance of city-
regions, conflicted and conflicting, such that they cannot be assumed to be ‘functionally 
integrated economic territories’ built solely on cooperation and association (Ward and Jonas, 
2004: 2121, see also Greenberg, 2010).   
 
The map of the global economy, despite allusions to one dominated by an archipelago of 
inter-dependent regions, is dominated by a few urban nodes in charge of globalised 
currencies, trade patterns, and investment flows (Ward and Jonas, 2004).  Consequently, 
lagging regions are likely to be further relegated, remaining trapped in low value-added 
production (Greenberg, 2010). Competitive city-regionalism is a politics of space, ongoing, 
conflicted, and dynamic; and not simply a functional response to the competition dictates of 
the global economy (Ward and Jonas, 2004). 
  
Claims of a flexible accumulation regime founded on a knowledge economy are flawed in 
suggesting that these amount to displacement of standardised mass production, for these 
remain a central aspect of capitalist production and flexibilities and knowledge are used 
simply to improve them (Greenberg, 2010). The divergent trajectories of city-regions beg the 
question of whether economic success is an outcome of knowledge-intensity or knowledge-
intensity is an outcome of economic success (ibid).  
 
3.5. Conclusion 
 
While new regionalism is embedded within some analysis of the flexible accumulation 
regime, its leading industrial ensembles, spatial dynamics and architecture, and the need for 
institutions and conventions that generate and sustain learning; new regionalism fails to 
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engage with actual drivers of regional economic development. While helpful in expanding 
the scope of critical sectors beyond finance and producer services to include artisanal, craft-
based, and design–intensive; and high-technology industries; standardised mass production 
remains equally critical. Besides, higher quality and technology intensive products that will 
make regions competitive require technology acquisition and learning, a complex process 
different from that envisaged by Storper (1998), and better theorized by Khan (2009), where 
learning rents are higher and loss-financing periods are longer; and where a different set of 
institutions and conventions are required. Technology acquisition and learning as central 
factors in generating and sustaining higher levels of growth and competitiveness is the focus 
of the next chapter.  
 
Because each region represents unique configurations of social and political life, they are 
each caught up in a unique develop trajectory (Scott 2004). Even if departing from a different 
premise, Scott and Garofoli (2007:6) agree that ‘path dependency means that lock-in of the 
regional economy to suboptimal outcomes is an open possibility’, and ‘that some sort of 
collective steering mechanism may also be required in order to avoid the worst pitfalls of this 
condition’. Learning as a central ingredient for competitiveness - and institutions and policy 
as critical steering mechanisms to ensure such learning occurs - have to be analysed in 
relation to their capacity to assist regions in developing countries, to build the necessary and 
right capabilities for sustainable economic development.  
 
And as Rogerson (2009: 112) contends, ‘strategic planning for the building of Gauteng as a 
globally competitive city region is the most significant imprint of new regionalism on the 
South African policy landscape’. The fifth and sixth chapters will explore these features and 
fissures of competitive city-regionalism in the context of the Gauteng city region, against the 
need for catch-up, and for anchoring the city-region in a set of global cities whose economic 
trajectories are sophisticated and sustainable.   
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Chapter 04: Development as Structural Change, Competitiveness and the Catch-up 
problem 
 
4.1. Introduction 
 
Economic growth, contra Ricardo, is activity specific, with only certain types of economic 
activities and structures embodying the special ability to introduce (and induce) dynamism 
into a given economy (Reinert, 2007). Economic activities are qualitatively different: with 
some characterised by intensive and extensive diminishing returns and others by increasing 
returns; some embodying potentialities for technical change and innovation, and others that 
do not; and some with capacity to generate synergy effects and those without (Ocampo, 
2005). Increasing returns (economies of scale), technical change (expanded knowledge 
intensity), and cumulative causations associated with some economic activities are the 
mutually reinforcing factors that combine to produce structural change. Structural change 
therefore, the essence of economic development, is about a shift in the sectoral composition 
of production and international specialisation from (low-productivity) diminishing returns 
activities to (high-productivity) increasing returns activities (Thirwall, 2002; Reinert, 2007).  
 
At the heart of economic development, therefore, is the ability to consistently generate new 
and dynamic economic activities (Ocampo, 2005). It is about a constant search for different 
products of different levels of sophistication, and for quality-price combinations that allow 
for upward movement from low- to high- value-adding parts of the value chain within the 
same products or across different products (Khan, 2009). Innovations – i.e. finding ‘new 
combinations’ that include new activities, industrial structures, sectors, product qualities, 
production methods, sources and markets – and their full realisation, and diffusion through 
the system; are central engines of growth. These, together with complementarities, linkages, 
networks (between firms and activities), and the institutions allowing enabling such 
networks, account for the dynamism and efficiency of a given economic system (Ocampo, 
2005). These are the dynamics of production structures propelling structural change. 
 
For developing countries, innovations entails spreading new products, technologies, and 
organisational or commercial strategies previously developed elsewhere (Ocampo, 2005), in 
essence emulating rich countries’ economic structures (Reinert, 2007). This is what prompted 
Khan (2009: 9) to surmise that developing countries are beset with ‘the catching up problem’, 
defined as  
a) achieving the minimum quality that allows entry into globally competitive production 
for a variety of products even if initial entry quality is low;  
b) spreading basic manufacturing and productive capabilities broadly across the working 
population; and  
c) systematically moving up the ladder across product categories.  
 
This chapter argues that development as structural change is path dependent, where 
production experience (and its lack or loss), and short-term macroeconomic performance 
have long-term effects on growth and the presence of economies of scale (Ocampo, 2005). 
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Consequently, the pursuit of global city status or competitive regionalism, for cities of 
developing countries beset with the catch-up problem, must not be at the expense of 
industrialisation and building technological capabilities that will launch their countries on a 
sustainable path.  
 
The first section highlights the prospects and implications of different production structures, 
arguing that manufacturing remains a special sector, despite financialisation and allusions to 
the emergence of services as an additional engine of growth. Financialisation, and a rapid 
move to services, can signal for developing countries premature deindustrialisation, with 
strategies (competitive regionalism) blindly mimicking developed countries wherein 
deindustrialisation represents a logical phase in their structural change.  
 
The next section unravels divergent routes to economic development, highlighting 
differences between mainstream and heterodox (specifically the developmental state 
paradigm) approaches to economic development. It is the heterodox path that is seen as most 
sustainable for developing countries and their cities, characterised here as technological 
capability building, developmental states and selective industrial policy. The chapter 
concludes with some notes on competitiveness and the role of cities; arguing that cities in 
developing countries are critical to ushering in structural change and that their 
competitiveness will depend largely on the extent to which they launch their countries onto a 
sustainable path.  
 
4.2. Production Structures: Prospects and Implications 
4.2.1. Manufacturing as a special sector 
 
If economic development is about moving from simple, low quality, low cost, labour 
intensive products to complex, high quality, and high cost products; and a concomitant transit 
from basic to mature to evolving technologies; then manufacturing is its engine (Amsden, 
2001). Increases in the global share of manufacturing value-added and manufacturing exports 
are arguably at the heart of the global competitiveness of countries, creating new comparative 
advantages in international trade that help dislocate the deteriorating terms of trade of 
extractive economies. 
 
Take the automobile, a complex product comprised in roughly 3000 parts and components, 
evolved through varied production processes (carried out under different conditions) which 
each require different degrees and forms of specialization. Specialisations evident in the 
production of the various parts and components, in a series of independent firms in rubber, 
plastics, glass, textiles, electronics, steel and other metals (Abdulsomad, 1999). The cross-
pollination between these various independent firms, if properly and systematically 
coordinated, do not only generate considerable employment, but also generate technology 
and skills transfer, and thus contribute to building capacity in the economy as a whole.  
 
It is possible to argue then, that there is a ‘close association across countries between the 
level of per capita income and the degree of industrialization, and there also seems to be a 
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close association across countries between the growth of GDP and the growth of 
manufacturing industry’ (Thirwall, 2002: 40). Nicholas Kaldor, pioneering in advocating for 
a sectoral approach to the study of growth and development, developed three growth laws 
(and subsidiary propositions) that corroborate this assertion (Kaldor, 1966).  
 
The first law, states that ‘there is a close relationship between the growth of manufacturing 
output and the growth of the GDP’ (Thirwall, 2002: 41). This first correlation is based on the 
impact of manufacturing on productivity growth in the economy, where growth in 
manufacturing output leads to growth in productivity in manufacturing owing to static and 
dynamic returns to scale. This correlation between manufacturing output growth and 
manufacturing productivity growth represents Kaldor’s second law (also known as Verdoon’s 
law). The third law points to the positive causal relation between the rate of expansion in 
manufacturing activity, output and employment and productivity growth rate in the rest of the 
economy (outside of manufacturing). This correlation is based on the fact that expanding 
manufacturing transfers labour from low productivity sectors (such as agriculture and petty 
service activities) to the high productivity sector that is manufacturing (Thirlwall, 2002; 
Libanio and Moro, 2009). 
 
4.2.2. Financialisation, Services and Premature Deindustrialisation 
 
The concept of financialisation emerges from radical political economy, intended to designate 
‘a historical change in the nature of accumulation in the world economy towards one that has 
become increasingly finance-led’ (Newman, 2009: 542). Although based on different theories 
of finance, and yielding different definitions and analyses (see Lapavitsas, 2011 for a 
generous review), financialisation is broadly defined by Epstein (2005: 3) as ‘the increasing 
role of financial motives, financial markets, financial actors and financial institutions in the 
operation of the domestic and international economies’.  
 
Since the 1970s, there has been massive expansion and proliferation of financial markets, 
speculative assets, financial instruments and services, and actors and institutions, radically 
altering the character, functioning and performance of the economy at both micro and macro-
level (Palley, 2007). The collapse of the Bretton Woods and the abandonment of fixed 
exchange rates, expanded appropriation avenues for the financial sector, setting in motion 
profoundly altered patterns of accumulation in favour of finance (Newman, 2009). The 
(structure and operations of) financial markets, corporate behaviour, and economic policy 
serve as the primary conduits for financialisation (Palley, 2007).  
 
Financialisation has produced (a) an explosion in the ratio of global financial assets relative 
to global GDP; (b) increased profit extraction from finance as opposed to productive 
activities; (c) dominance of finance over industry; (d) poor performance in the real economy; 
(e) increased financial fragility, and (f) deepening income inequality and wage stagnation 
(Palley, 2007; Fine, 2009). Combined with the resulting decoupling of wage growth from 
productivity growth, these outcomes consolidate the international balance of power as 
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evidenced in the various global commodity chains and concentrated market structure 
(Ocampo, 2005; Newman, 2009). 
 
In addition to finance, there is the rise of advanced producer services (Sassen, 2001). 
References to a services economy and a post-industrial society are very much based on the 
argument that services have overtaken manufacturing as an engine of growth patterning 
structural change (Cohen, 2009). As a theory of economic development, the ‘service thesis’ 
basically posits that ‘services have replaced goods as the principal output of the economy and 
service jobs have replaced industrial jobs as the principal occupation of workers’ (Walker, 
2004: 98, original emphasis).   
 
In the normal course of economic development, economies reach a point (at least at a certain 
per capita income level), where there is a decline in the share of manufacturing employment 
and output (and possibly manufacturing exports), and the surge of services as the fastest 
growing sector of the economy (Palma, 2005). This is deindustrialisation (see Wells, 1994), 
wherein advanced economies resources are reallocated from industry into services. In 
addition to this upward deindustrialisation (continental Europe), three types of 
deindustrialisation are discernible from the varied experiences of economies, namely: normal 
Dutch disease (Netherlands); downward Dutch disease (Latin America), and reverse de-
industrialisation (Sub-Saharan Africa) (Palma, 2005).     
 
Countries suddenly discover commodities; generate a trade surplus from services (in 
particular tourism and finance), or introduce a drastic switch in the economic policy regime. 
Despite differences in resource endowment, and production structures, these countries 
suddenly become locked into a growth strategy content with generating a trade deficit in 
manufacturing as opposed to one aimed at generating a trade surplus in manufacturing 
(through industrialisation). For those among these countries that have not yet reached mature 
levels of industrialisation, this dramatic shift means degenerating into their original Ricardian 
comparative advantage levels (downward Dutch disease).  
 
4.3. Divergent routes to economic development 
4.3.1. Comparative advantage, facilitating states and efficient markets 
 
The endowment structures of economies (i.e. relative abundance of natural resources, human 
capital and physical capital), given (produced by market forces) at any stage of a country’s 
development (evolving from one stage to the next); represent each country’s latent 
comparative advantage (Lin, 2012). They are the primary (if not the sole) endogenous 
determinants of an economy’s relative factor prices and optimal industrial structure15. 
Optimal industrial structures therefore inevitably conform to (and evolve together with) the 
existing endowment structure. Thus, a ‘low-income country with abundant labour or natural 
                                                          
15
 Reflected in levels of capital-intensity; viz. resource/labour intensity, optimal firm sizes, production scale, 
market range, transaction complexity, nature of risks (Lin, 2010: 3) 
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resources and scarce capital will have comparative advantage and be competitive in labour- 
or resource-intensive industries’ (Lin and Monga, 2012: 147).  
 
Consequently, developing countries should strive to build industries that conform to their 
latent comparative advantage, and benchmark themselves against growing economies with 
similar endowments structures but higher per capita incomes. Structural transformation here 
does not result from selective industrial policy (Chang, 1994), but from efficient markets that 
determine factor market prices and allocate resources in a manner consistent with a country’s 
comparative advantage (Lin and Monga, 2012). The role of the state is facilitation, with its 
interventions restricted to reducing information asymmetries, coordination failures, and 
externalities (Lin and Chang, 2009).  
 
Open economies are said to exhibit strong convergence tendencies than closed ones. Import-
substitution is therefore regarded as comparative-advantage defying, and is faulted for its 
inevitable detrimental outcome of reduced import trade, suppressed export trade, and (most 
importantly) for reallocating resources away from comparative advantage industries ((Lin, 
2012: 304). While acknowledging the potential for firms to achieve a high ratio of exports to 
foreign markets and fast technology upgrade through import-substitution, it is said that these 
exports will not be profitable, such that countries will ‘have poor external accounts, 
accumulate foreign debt, and be easily affected by external shocks’ (Lin and Monga, 2012: 
305).  
 
Technology transfer, an important ingredient in any industrialisation effort, is also argued to 
be based on the economy’s endowment structure. If this endowment structure is respected in 
attempts towards technology upgrade, the costs of learning for firms will be lower precisely 
‘because the distance between the new industry/technology and the old industry/technology is 
smaller’ (ibid, 303). It is highly likely too that the patent protections for these mature 
technologies will have expired, or that the license fees will be much lower, bolstering the 
argument that technology upgrade under comparative-advantage-following strategies will be 
cheaper (ibid).  
 
In this framework, new structural economics (NSE), the ‘mystery of diverging economic 
performances’ lie in the relation between economic development strategy and its relation to 
each given country’s latent comparative advantage (ibid). Comparative-advantage-following 
(CAF) strategies (facilitating states and efficient markets) generate ‘virtuous cycles’ of 
growth, and comparative-advantage-defying (CAD) strategies generate ‘vicious cycles’ 
(developmental states applying selective industrial policy) of low and unsustainable growth.  
 
The policy recommendation emerging here is one of outward-orientated trade regimes, 
distinguished for the ‘low or negligible impediments to imports, relatively uniform incentives 
for different production activities, and incentives for export sale equal to the incentives for 
domestic sale’ (Wade, 1990: 11).   
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4.3.2. Technological capability building, developmental states and selective industrial 
policy 
 
Heterodox approaches contend that accelerated growth results from high rates of new 
physical capital, and deliberately broadening and deepening technological capabilities 
(Rasiah and Jomo, 1999). As opposed to comparative advantage; long-run differences in 
industrial development are largely attributable to differences in the accumulation of 
technological capabilities (ibid).  
 
There are three generic categories of these capabilities, namely (a) production capabilities; 
(b) project execution capabilities; and (c) innovation capabilities (Amsden, 2001). These 
capabilities are a combination of the formal education of workers and managers of firms, and 
the tacit knowledge (uncodifiable) (Khan, 2009: 7). The latter can only be acquired in a 
process of learning-by-doing – in the routines of production, which in itself requires 
expanded investment to enable such learning, over time and at lower returns on investment 
(ibid). Competitiveness depends primarily on the existence, intensity and spread of these 
capacities across various industries and firms in a given economy; critical for determining the 
pace with (and extent to) which firms can access, borrow, master and improve upon existing 
technologies (Lall, 2004; Khan, 2009). 
  
These capabilities - acquired through costly, risky and uncertain trial-and-error - are the main 
sources of productivity, wage and profit growth. But such growth largely results from upward 
movement across the product quality ladder (high-ends of same product or alternative higher 
quality products), an outcome of (and amounting to) movement in the technology path from 
‘mature’ technologies to ‘evolving’ ones (Khan, 2009). Although it might prove relatively 
easier to enter lower quality indices of a given product (or lower quality products) where 
technologies are mature, there is a real threat of competition from other developing countries 
entering the global market simultaneously, and the possibility of these products (and 
technologies) becoming obsolete in the short- to medium-term (ibid). On the other end, there 
is potential for future productivity growth and quality improvements in products embodying 
evolving technologies (ibid). 
 
But complexity and scale of technology involved in the production of high-quality products, 
coupled with the level of backwardness of the given economy, combine to increase the cost 
and duration of learning, i.e. of technological capability building (Lall, 2004). Private firms 
are unlikely to invest in learning beyond a particular point, since the process involves 
operating at a loss for a while. Hence, there are market failures
16
 constraining learning and 
technology acquisition (Khan, 2009). One of the key interventions relates to loss-financing, 
‘measured as a per unit “subsidy” […] which brings the domestic cost of production […] into 
line with the global price’ (ibid, 14). If learning is financed and the learning effort is 
                                                          
16
These include appropriability problems facing investment in skills, innovators, and discovery; failures of 
coordination, and institutional problems in ensuring effort during learning 
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accordingly enforced, a breakeven point of competitiveness must be reached at which loss-
financing can be withdrawn.  
 
In East Asia, loss-financing came in the form of inter alia, subsidized long-term credit, import 
protection, and export subsidies (Khan, 2009). These subsidies did distort relative factor 
prices, reconfiguring the incentive structure of the economy in favour of industries, firms, 
activities and technologies that were targeted as strategic (Shapiro, 2007). To enforce effort, 
reciprocal control mechanisms (RCMs) were adopted, including export targets, local-content 
requirements, technology transfer and upgrade obligations, and use of domestic raw 
materials. As Amsden (2001) sums it, a control mechanism identifies the process to be 
controlled, detects what is given (has a sensor), compares what is with what should be (has an 
assessor), changes behavior (has an effector), and transmits information between functions 
(has a communications network). Selective industrial policy, at the centre of these 
interventions, was indeed itself designed as a control mechanism to deliberately redirect 
economic behavior towards the industrial structures desired. 
 
From this perspective, the ‘catching up problem’ is not about building facilitating states for 
efficient markets that allocate resources accordingly to build industry-technology structures 
that follow (not transform) the endowment structure. Capital formation and capital 
accumulation (as opposed to efficient allocation of resources), is the central mechanism 
generating industrial competitiveness (Wade, 1990). At the heart of such capital formation 
and accumulation is a developmental state that performs development banking, local content 
management, selective seclusion, and national firm formation in a manner that imposes 
discipline in the market and facilitates industrial and technology upgrade towards dynamic 
comparative advantage.   
 
Here, the question is not whether or not to design and implement industrial policy in a bid to 
impart a ‘directional thrust’ to the economy (Wade, 2014); the question is what constitutes 
such a policy in a context of changing international rules of the game, rapid technical change, 
changing geographies of production (Lall, 2004). 
 
4.4. Conclusion: Competitiveness and the role of cities 
 
Inter-locality competition is a state project, and particular cities and regions within national 
territories are as critical to economic development as major firms, technological infrastructure 
and labour force (Brenner, 2004). The state reconcentrates ‘socioeconomic assets and 
advanced infrastructural investments within the most globally competitive city regions’ (ibid, 
2004: 176). After all, it is said that geographic unevenness is an inevitable outcome of 
economic development (The World Bank, 2009). Rising concentration of economic activity, 
as reinforced by the strategy of reconcentration, will in a market-led economic development 
process, lead geographical convergence in living standards as the benefits of growth spillover 
(ibid).     
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City competitiveness is defined here as ‘the set of institutions, policies, and factors that 
determine the level of productivity of a city or a region’ (The World Bank, 2010: 2, original 
emphasis). Critical factors accounting for local competitiveness include, inter alia, a legacy of 
agglomeration economies (generating productivity gains associated with localisation and 
urbanisation economies); innovation (produced by knowledge spillovers transmitted through 
learning by observation, meeting and leaving); human capital (higher levels of formal 
education and tacit knowledge); a competitive environment; infrastructure and private 
investment; and quality of local governance (reduced cost of doing business and favourable 
local investment climate) (ibid).  
 
These factors, primary concerns for local administrations, are at the centre of what Harvey 
(1989) termed ‘a shift to entrepreneurialism in urban governance’. The modes of intervention 
that local states adopt in pursuit of these critical factors, and in particular lowering the cost of 
doing business include the dismantling of constraints (laissez-faire, relaxing regulations 
viewed to increase the cost of doing business, from land use to taxes to environmental 
regulations, for example); retrenching welfare (shifting public spending away from areas of 
social need to areas of return on investment), assembling and rolling out of enablers (aidez-
faire, flagship projects, and incentives for example), and disciplining deviants (Purcell, 2008). 
Combined, these modes of local state intervention elevate the market as ‘the inner regulator 
of the state, rather than the state as an external regulator of the market’ (Leitner et al., 2007: 
3). Such is the essence of the post-Keynesian competition states, and of neoliberalisation, 
characteristic of cities and urban regions trapped in the competitiveness logic advanced by 
the World Bank above.        
 
In contrast, Hill and Kim (2000) have persuasively argued that the assumption of 
convergence in the economic base, social structure, and spatial structure in the global city 
literature is a flawed one. The rise of cities like Seoul and Tokyo cannot be delinked from the 
experience of late industrialisation, and, in particular, from ‘the relationship between 
industrial policy and finance institutionalized in a developmental state’ (Hill and Kim, 2000: 
2167).  
 
Cities in these contexts remain very critical to ushering structural change, given that the 
‘assets of cities are central for economic competitiveness and economic dynamism in general’ 
(Amin, 2003: 115). Although developmental state capacities may be weak at urban and 
regional levels in certain contexts (see Turok, 2010 on South Africa), it remains important 
that trade, industrial, fiscal and monetary policy converge with the priorities, interventions 
and investments aimed at economic development at these levels.  
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Section B: Quick Notes on South Africa’s Global City Region 
 
Chapter 05: Africa’s first global city-region 
5.1. Introduction 
 
For the ex-premier of Gauteng, Mbhazima Shilowa, the only mechanism to propelling the 
country onto a higher growth path was to position Gauteng as a globally competitive city-
region (Shilowa, 2006). Positioned thus, Gauteng’s role in the global economy would be 
enhanced, and the socio-economic challenges that beset it - most notably poverty, 
unemployment and underdevelopment – would be resolved. 
 
Johannesburg, for its part, has long positioned itself as a world class African city (CoJ, 1999; 
CoJ, 2006; CoJ, 2011), and has the rare distinction of being the most cited global city in 
Africa in global rankings (Beaverstock et al., 1999; Sassen, 2009a; Knight Frank Research, 
2014). Ekurhuleni and Tshwane are critical economies nationally (SACN, 2006), and 
together with Johannesburg, and the province’s secondary cities make Gauteng the most 
urbanized and economically dynamic province in the country.  
 
The concentrations of economic activities, opportunities and potential; the predominantly 
urban nature of the province; concentration of people; and the extensive economic flows and 
networks that link the province with secondary cities in neighbouring municipalities are cited 
as some of the reasons for Gauteng to function as a global city region (GPG, 2006). If it 
succeeds, it will become Africa’s first global city region – one of those competitive urban 
agglomerations Scott and Storper write about (see chapter 03). This chapter explores 
Gauteng’s current economic trajectory; explores the emergence of the city region agenda; and 
enunciates on the economic policy package for the city region emerging in the years 2006-
2011.  
 
5.2. The Gauteng economy  
 5.2.1. South Africa’s economic engine 
  
The country’s space economy is marked by concentrations of people and economic activity in 
certain areas; largely in cities emerging and advanced (see map 5.1). Only 16 percent of the 
country’s land account for 92 percent of the formal economy, and 95 percent of the 
population (van Huyssteen and Botha, 2008). Taken together, the country’s five largest cities 
- Johannesburg, Cape Town, Tshwane, eThekwini, and Ekurhuleni - collectively account for 
55.7 percent of the national Gross Value Added (GVA) in manufacturing; 75.33 percent in 
financial, intermediation, insurance, real estate and business services; and 52.98 percent in 
community, social and personal services; and about 44.1 percent of the national number of 
jobs (SACN, 2006). 
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Map 5.1: Concentrations (economic activity and population), South Africa (Source: van Huyssteen and 
Botha, 2008) 
Three of these largest cities are in Gauteng, making it not only the largest urban conurbation 
in the country, but also the most important local economy in the sub-continent (The 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), 2011). The City of 
Johannesburg (CoJ) contributed 47.6 percent, City of Tshwane (CoT) 26 percent and 
Ekurhuleni 19 percent to the Gross Domestic Product by Region (GDPR) in 2010; while 
Gauteng itself contributed about 35 percent (some R640 billion) to the national economy 
(GDoF, 2010).  
5.2.2. A Services Economy? 
 
In terms of sectoral composition, the Gauteng economy mirrored that of the national 
economy, a not so surprising fact given its dominance (see figure 5.1.). It is finance and 
business services; government, social and personal services; and manufacturing that are the 
three biggest contributors in both cases.  
 
Figure 5.1: Sectoral Composition, Gauteng and South Africa, 2009 (Source: GPG, 2010) 
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While these three sectors still emerge as the dominant sectors for all Gauteng municipalities; 
a nuanced picture emerges when the sectoral composition of the Gauteng economy is 
disaggregated to metropolitan and district levels (see figure 5.2. below). Only Johannesburg 
has finance and business services as the highest contributor to its local economy at 29.4 
percent, with Tshwane and Metsweding
17
 specialising in government, social and personal 
services at 29.9 percent and 19.7 percent respectively. Finance and business services 
however, was the second most important contributor to both Tshwane and Ekurhuleni’s 
economies.  
Manufacturing remains the biggest contributor to the Ekurhuleni and Sedibeng 
municipalities, with Sedibeng highest at 35 percent. Sedibeng has comparative advantage in 
the areas of food and beverages, non-metallic products, and metals, machinery and 
equipment; while Ekurhuleni has a broader industrial base, with comparative advantage in a 
number of industries with the exception of textile and clothing, and electronic appliances. In 
manufacturing, Johannesburg specialised in textile and clothing, wood and paper, and 
electronic appliances; Tshwane in metals, machinery and equipment, and transport 
equipment; Metsweding in transport equipment, petroleum and chemicals, and wood and 
paper; and the West Rand in non-metallic products.      
It is interesting to note that although Gauteng means ‘the place of gold’, given that province’s 
mining history; mining and quarrying makes up the lowest contribution to that province’s 
economy. However, it still makes up about 13 percent of Sedibeng’s economy and 19.3 
percent of the West Rand’s economy; making it the fourth largest contributor in both 
instances.  
 
Figure 5.2: Top-3 Contributors (per municipality) + Mining and Quarrying (Data Source: GPG, 2010) 
                                                          
17
 Metsweding was merged into Tshwane just before the 2011 local government elections, and as such no longer 
exists as an independent district municipality 
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5.2.3. Manufacturing matters 
 
The province’s share of imports was around 59 percent in 2009 (making up some R316 
billion), while its share of exports stood at around 67 percent (total value of R337.6 billion) 
(GPG, 2010). Mineral products, machinery and electrical equipment, and transport equipment 
accounted for a combined 59.61 percent of imports in 2009 (with mainly China, Germany 
and the U.S contributing most to imports); mineral products and precious or semi-precious 
stones and metals together make up 58.79 percent of the exports. Manufacturing was the 
highest contributor to both imports and exports in the province, at 86.8 and 74.6 percent 
respectively (ibid). Manufacturing thus remains important, accounting also for substantial 
output, and gross domestic fixed investment (GDFI) (see table 5.1).   
Table 5.1: Manufacturing Key Economic Indicators, Gauteng, 2002-2009 (Source: GPG, 2010) 
Indicator 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Output 22.6% 22.3% 23.4% 25.0% 26.7% 28.0% 28.9% 25.8% 
Employment 14.9% 14.9% 14.9% 14.9% 14.8% 14.7% 14.4% 14.3% 
Exports 77.8% 83.8% 85.3% 79.7% 82.2% 82.4% 74.5% 74.5% 
Imports 95.0% 95.3% 90.9% 91.0% 89.6% 90.2% 88.2% 86.7% 
GDFI 26.1% 24.3% 24.5% 24.1% 24.6% 23.4% 23.0% 19.7% 
Labour 
Productivity 
0.20 0.19 0.20 0.21 0.21 0.22 0.23 0.21 
 
The highest contributions to gross value add (GVA) are from petroleum and chemicals (at 
25.3% in 2009), metals, machinery and equipment (at 24.7%), and food and beverages (at 
12.8%) (GPG, 2010). The two, with the exception of metals, machinery and equipment, were 
also highest in labour productivity, together with electronic appliances (ibid). Textiles and 
clothing saw the biggest decline in employment, steepest in 2005 and 2009; while furniture 
and other manufacturing saw an increase in employment. Metals, machinery and equipment 
had the highest percentages of all skills levels (high-, semi-, and unskilled) (ibid).         
5.3. The envisaged future Gauteng economy  
5.3.1. Towards a globally competitive city-region  
 
The vision for a Gauteng globally competitive city region is elaborated in a Gauteng City 
Region Perspective document adopted in August 2006 (GPG, 2006). Gauteng is a critical 
player in both the national and international space economies, its functional economic 
geography too important to be suffocated by administrative boundaries that separate the 
different municipal spaces making up that province. The comparative and competitive 
advantages of the component municipal spaces; flows of capital, labour, goods and services, 
extra-local linkages shaping the regional economy constitute region’s functional economic 
geography. Harnessing this functional economic geography requires (in the first instance) 
aligning interventions and investments (ibid).  
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Assets identified for building the Gauteng city region include leadership, vision and strategy; 
successful cities and an established system of metropolitan government; growing economic 
sectors (notably services and finance); strategic economic infrastructure; and political and 
territorial cohesion (ibid). Challenges include infrastructure under strain; social problems and 
environmental pressures; weak intergovernmental relations; inadequate municipal capacity; 
and growing new economic sectors. The latter relates to unspecified supply-side constraints 
blocking the emergence and growth of new sectors, more specifically knowledge-based 
activities of the ‘new economy’; and skills deficits for the growth of these activities (ibid). 
The creative industries sector is said to have substantial potential for employment and 
enterprise development.  
The GCR footprint includes the three metros and secondary cities in Gauteng, together with 
adjacent secondary cities (map 5.2). A Gauteng Spatial Development Perspective (GSDP) 
providing a spatial vision for GCR, and a Gauteng City Region Coalition that would serve to 
embed the vision. Flagship projects included a Global City Region Observatory (GCRO), a 
Global City Region Academy (GCRA), and reorienting development agencies, provincial and 
local, to focus on economic growth.   
                
                Map 5.2: Schematic Footprint of the Gauteng City-Region (Source: GCRO, 2009) 
This GCR vision for Gauteng has become the golden thread for visioning and policy in the 
GPG. A GCR Roadmap, developed in 2008, outlined eleven strategic pathways for 
implementation, and references to the vision have prefaced most of the GPG policy 
documents since (e.g. GPG, 2014). Only the first and second pathways make direct reference 
to the economy; alluding to positioning the economy globally, through building a knowledge-
based economy. (GPG, 2008). The latter will result from establishing a GCR development 
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agency; understanding the GCR economy content and footprint; building extra-local linkages 
and facilitating clustering of knowledge and innovation (ibid).   
5.3.2. Metropolitan aspirations 
 
For their part, the metros have referred (largely in passing) to the importance of contributing 
to the GCR vision in their respective growth and development strategies, but adopted visions 
of their own with little cross-referencing (CoJ, 2006; CoT, 2006; EMM, 2006).   
Tshwane’s vision to be the ‘leading international African capital of excellence’ was to be 
premised on high-impact, fast track interventions to accelerate shared growth, and halve 
unemployment by 2014 (CoT, 2006: 6). The City intends to transit from traditional heavy 
industry input markets and low value-added production towards sophisticated, high value-
added production, including value-add activities in mining and agriculture (ibid). Motor 
vehicles, parts and accessories contributed most to export value and trade, employment 
generation and skills development (ibid). On the overall, Tshwane saw the highest annual 
percentage growth rates in both exports and imports in the period 1995-2004, when compared 
with the other four largest cities in the country (ibid).  
Ekurhuleni is ‘Africa’s workshop’, with high concentrations of manufacturing plants and 
activity (EMM, 2006). Its vision is to be smart, creative and developmental (ibid). The 
manufacturing industry in Ekurhuleni is primarily machinery and equipment, metals, 
chemicals, and the plastic products subsectors. The decline in the sector’s performance is 
attributed to adjustments in the global economy (ibid). Opportunities identified for the 
industry include a national casting technology centre, and an aerospace network; and the 
logistics and transport infrastructure in the area. Economic sectors and industries identified 
for support include manufacturing (both technology intensive and labour intensive), 
construction, services (in particular business tourism, sports and culture, and smart services), 
and finance; and agriculture (given good agricultural land), and mining.          
Johannesburg, despite its economic history of gold mining and related manufacturing 
(Harrison and Zack, 2012), is ‘the finance, trade and business services hub of the country’ 
(CoJ, 2006: 25), a world class African city. It is a basing point for the global economy, a 
postindustrial production site and marketplace (Metileni, 2011). The GDS calls for 
diversification of the local economy by forming new industries at speed, and simultaneously 
regenerating older ones. The strategic interventions linked to this include, inter alia: targeting 
and supporting sectors with high growth and labour absorption potential; assisting established 
sectors to focus on value add across the value chain; and facilitating the restructure of 
manufacturing and related sunset industries (ibid). Strong linkages with the national, regional 
and global economy will be achieved through harnessing the city’s comparative and 
competitive advantages in finance, business services and trade. Lowering the cost of doing 
business will continue to be central in promoting economic growth, by reducing regulatory 
burdens, providing appropriate, high-quality, and affordable economic infrastructure and 
services; and by reducing crime, and ensuring an appropriate mix of skills.   
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3.3 Provincial frameworks 
 
Smart industries (ICT, pharmaceuticals), trade and services (finance, film), tourism, 
agriculture (agro-processing and biotech), infrastructure expansion and investment, and 
manufacturing (steel related industries, automotive parts and components, beer and malt) are 
the sectors targeted for support and investment (GPG, 2005). These are selected on the basis 
of potential and opportunities for growth in nominal and real investment, value added, 
productivity and employment (ibid). The kind of targeted support and investment, however, 
is not specified. Other mechanisms related to the economy include Small Medium and Micro 
Enterprises (SMMEs) support; skills development; broad based black economic 
empowerment (BBBEE); and expanded public works programme (EPWP) (ibid). These 
efforts will contribute to the GDS’s ten year target of 8% economic growth rate, resulting in a 
decline in unemployment from the 25.7% in 2005 to 12.8% in 2014. 
The Gauteng Employment, Growth and Development Strategy (GEGDS) outlines the 
strategic choices and programmes for ‘a strong and sustainable Gauteng economy’ (GDED, 
2009: 4). The structural change it proposes is one based on ‘an endogenous growth trajectory 
that is based primarily on “innovation”, “green growth” and “inclusivity”’ (ibid, 5; original 
emphasis). The first, innovation, refers to productive use of existing resources, and the 
consolidation of a knowledge-based economy; the second entails investment in green 
products and processes; while the last refers to expansion in access to economic opportunities 
for those hitherto marginalised and excluded.  
The Gauteng Industrial Policy Framework (GIPF) provides an analysis of Gauteng’s 
industrial structure (including its spatial dimensions), sectoral composition, an input-output 
analysis (for backward and forward linkages, and employment multipliers), and how sectors 
are inserted into specific supply chains (GDED, 2010). The main conclusion emerging from 
the input-output analysis is that manufacturing is the engine of growth; more backwardly 
linked to other sectors, its demand stimulating economy wide growth in intermediate output 
than services. The latter is also said to rely heavily on manufacturing than vice versa.  
The input-output analysis reveals the sectors in Table 5.2 as the most strategic for policy 
targeting. These sectors, more specifically food and beverages, furniture, textiles and 
clothing, construction, machinery and equipment, and automotives and components have 
high backward and forward linkages with other sector; high employment multipliers, and low 
entry and learning costs.  
Table 5.2: Potential sectors for policy targeting in Gauteng (Source: GDED, 2010) 
Potential sectors for policy targeting based on backward linkages and employment multipliers 
 Transport equipment 
 Wood and paper, publishing and printing 
 Textiles, clothing and leather 
 Food, beverages and tobacco 
 Other non-metal mineral 
 Construction 
 Metals, metal products, machinery and 
equipment 
 Transport services 
 Catering and accommodation 
 Electrical machinery and apparatus 
 Radio, TV, instruments, watches and clocks 
 Furniture and other manufactures 
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With references to the National Industrial Policy Framework (NIPF) and the Industrial Policy Action 
Plans (IPAPs), the GIPF outlines strategic programmes for Gauteng, namely: sector strategies; 
strategic infrastructure investment; strategic procurement; SMME support; trade and investment 
facilitation; reducing the cost of doing business; BBBEE strategy; Green Economy Strategy; and the 
Gauteng Tooling Initiative (GTI).  
Key among the outcomes that sector strategies should achieve includes non-exploitative profitability; 
increased output, employment generation, and capital investment; as well as increased sector export 
performance, and long-term sector viability and sustainability. 
 
5.3. Concluding notes 
    
Interestingly, even as finance and business services has become the most critical sector in the 
Johannesburg, Gauteng and national economies; manufacturing remains a critical sector as evidenced 
in its dominance in international trade (imports and exports) and higher productivity levels, despite 
shedding jobs over the years under review. Despite allusions to deepening the economy’s penetration 
into finance and business services and a dematerialized knowledge economy (as opposed to the old 
industrial economy); the provincial government recognises the strategic importance of manufacturing 
as an engine of growth (see GPG, 2010). Both the GEGDS and the GIPF of the province identify 
sectors and industries for strategic policy support; selected on the basis of potential and opportunities 
for extent and intensity of backward and forward linkages, and growth in nominal and real 
investment, value added, productivity and employment. The sector strategies developed in line with 
the GIPF will hopefully help reorientate public expenditure, in the area of economic infrastructure. Of 
the four industries (namely business tourism, high value-added manufacturing, logistics and 
information and communications technology (ICT)) that the Blue IQ mega-projects were 
concentrated, half the initial budget allocated (R1.7 billion in 2001) went into business tourism 
(Rogerson, 2004). Some of the remaining half was crucial in cementing the automotive industry in 
Tshwane.    
 
Arguably, the argument for competitive regionalism contained in the City region perspective is 
premised on a series of assumptions. The first is that to be successful, Gauteng has to accept that 
neoliberal globalisation as a given; and that regional success depends on a kind of competitiveness 
whose terms conform to its logics (GPG, 2006, see Greenberg, 2010). The second assumption is that 
Gauteng cities and the region itself have to adopt an entrepreneurial approach to governance, geared 
primarily towards investment attraction, retention and expansion (of largely foreign investment) 
(ibid). The third is that advanced producer services and finance are the most important measure of a 
regions global capacity, connectivity and competitiveness (ibid). The fourth that this connectivity and 
competitiveness is to be enhanced through additional measures including the presence of 
multinational corporations, and the staging of international cultural and sporting events. As already 
alluded to in earlier chapters, these assumptions have detrimental implications for an urban region of 
the South, such as Gauteng is. 
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Section C: Conclusion 
 
 
Even in a context of neoliberal globalisation, changing international rules, rapid technical 
change, and changing geographies of production; it is still possible to support the city 
(Morgan, 2012), and to support manufacture through selective industrial policy (Chang, 
2005). National policy and investments and lobbying, remain important in shaping the 
economic trajectories of cities, even as these cities and urban regions are said to have 
ascended as critical actors in their own right in the global economy.  
 
The National Spatial Development Perspective (NSDP), in advocating for concentration of 
fixed investments in areas of economic potential, is basically redirecting development into 
South Africa’s largest cities, which is where the highest concentrations of economic activity, 
output, opportunities and potential exist. It is a case of state spatial selectivity, the 
priviledging not only of specific areas (thereby ignoring possibilities for change in the 
economic fortunes of other regions), but also of specific economic activities (latent potential 
in activities beyond those already thriving is ignored).  
 
The Gauteng city region is one such privileged space, whose economic performance is of 
national interest. As it declares in its own GCR strategic perspective, the GCR vision is a 
national project. It is a vision launched on the back of tertiarisation – a business services and 
finance sector-led economic trajectory – which is celebrated as a critical comparative and 
competitive advantage (GPG, 2006). If Gauteng is to be a globally competitive city region, 
this sector must be nurtured, and efforts be made to build a knowledge-based economy (ibid). 
To do so, cities within the city-region must become entrepreneurial in their approach to 
governance (ibid).  
 
But even in the context of neoliberal urbanism, and internationalisation projects modelled on 
buzzwords like global cities/global city regions; it is possible to adopt development paths that 
do not conform narrowly to the dictates of financialisation. For in a context like 
Johannesburg and Gauteng, where the rise of finance and services is celebrated (see CoJ, 
2002; GPG, 2006), a development trajectory anchored on these sectors undermines chances 
for catch up, and are better off with the kind of structural change that has industrialisation as 
its core strategy.  
 
The causal relations between ‘successful’ city-regions and the knowledge economy is a 
complex one, and evidence in ascending global cities of the South demonstrates amply that 
those cities are post-industrial sites and market places with thriving knowledge economies 
because they are successful, not vice versa. It is because of Sao Paolo, Seoul and Shanghai’s 
economic histories of heavy manufacturing that they are now thriving command and control 
centres (Sassen, 2009a). The knowledge economy (to which information technologies, 
finance and services are central) is not delinked from older material economies of cities. If 
anything, the varied forms of linkages between components of the knowledge economy and 
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older material economies is vital for understanding the differences in the economic bases of 
cities, and how these differences are continuously reproduced (Sassen, 2011).  
 
The deep complex histories of cities and urban regions are therefore important in explaining 
their specialised differences and roles in the global economy, or (rather) the various circuits 
within which they insert themselves in that economy. Global cities are distinguished by 
concentrations of command and control functions (i.e. finance and business services), those 
specialised capacities required to debug, manage, service (and by extension enable) digitised 
and globalised firms and markets. But these functions are not generic; they emerge from, are 
shaped by and embedded within specialised complex structures of localised economies.  
 
The character and dynamics of the production structures of cities, and the economic 
development trajectories that cities find themselves locked into; are therefore not entirely a 
result of functions assigned to them in the international division of labour, as Friedmann 
(1995a, 1995b) argued. The long-term urban development strategies, like the Joburg 2040 
Growth and Development Strategy or Ekurhuleni 2025, and economic strategies adopted to 
support them, are critical platforms for defining and driving development agenda for each 
city. It is in these strategic platforms that the concepts of ‘global city’ and the ‘global city 
region’ have become overarching descriptors of the kind of city futures aspired to. These 
concepts are in these platforms under-defined, and not critically examined for their 
implications for the kind of production structures and economic trajectories they purport or 
imply. 
 
If the specialised economic histories of cities matter, and economic development is path 
dependent, the rise of finance and advanced producer services in cities must be analysed 
against the levels of per capita income in a country; the kind of deindustrialisation upon 
which the rise is premised, and (for developing countries) the chances for catch up, and the 
economic trajectory they launch the economy into. If the industrial base is low, and the 
deindustrialisation emerging is downward and premature, these countries will potentially 
degenerate into their original Ricardian comparative advantage.   
 
Industrialisation is distinguished by complex production processes, technology intensity and 
higher rents for learning. It allows for product differentiation, higher value-add, increased 
productivity levels, and higher income elasticity of demand. There are increasing returns to 
scale embedded in manufacture, and its growth depends initially on agriculture and later on 
exports. It is the sector with the most intensive and extensive backward (upstream) and 
forward (downstream) linkages, and therefore the unique potential and capacity to carry 
forward and upward the entire economy (Thirwall, 2002).   
 
Urban regions in countries beset with the catch up problem must build technological 
capabilities, a risky and costly endeavour that requires loss financing. Such loss financing 
cannot be delinked from selective industrial policy with in-built reciprocal control 
mechanisms, and aimed primarily at industrialisation and structural change. After all, metro 
performance is not only an indication of a city’s economics base, sectoral composition and 
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international specialisation; but also reflects the impact of national industrial, fiscal, monetary 
and trade policies (Brookings Institution, 2010). Ultimately, competitiveness for cities of 
developing countries riddled with the catch up problem has to do with creative destruction of 
the dynamics of their production structures, through technological capability building, 
developmental states and selective industrial policy.  
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